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Unclean Hands and Self-Inflicted Wounds:
The Significance of Plaintiff Conduct in
Actions for Misrepresentation Under
Rule 1Ob-5
Theresa A. Gabaldon*
INTRODUCTION
Federal courts have recognized a private right of action for
of Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10bviolation
the
51 since 1946.2 Although a body of law has developed regarding
* Associate Professor, University of Arizona College of Law. I acknowledge with gratitude the efforts of Robert Palmer, the comments of my colleagues Dan Dobbs and Junius Hoffman, and the research assistance of
Bridget Fitzgibbons.
1. Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the
mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982). Pursuant to this authority, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) adopted Rule 10b-5 which provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the
mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1986).
2. The District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania first recognized this private right in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512,
513-14 (E.D. Pa. 1946). The Supreme Court first recognized the right in 1971 in
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the metes and bounds of private suits brought under the Rule,
several aspects of the law remain indistinct. One of the more
important details that has yet to be fully resolved is the relevance of a plaintiff's conduct to the existence of a private right
of action.
Over the years, courts regularly have reviewed plaintiff
conduct to determine whether it should constitute a bar to recovery under Rule 10b-5. Although courts have disapproved of
conduct ranging from the merely negligent to the blatantly
criminal, 3 they have not been uniform in modes of analysis
used and results achieved. Since 1976, however, there has been
general agreement that a plaintiff's negligence, although regrettable, should not bar recovery. 4 Despite this basic consensus, courts have continued to differ where plaintiff conduct is
more culpable than negligence.
This Article reviews the way courts historically have analyzed plaintiff conduct in Rule 10b-5 litigation, then examines
the current state of the law on this issue, and finally offers a
suggestion for its future direction. The definitional scheme of
this Article does not purport to derive from any particular case
or cases. Therefore, unless otherwise indicated, the phrases
"justifiable reliance" and "justifiable reliance context" refer to
situations in which a plaintiff has detrimentally relied on a misrepresentation, and the quality of the plaintiff's attention to
self-protection is later raised as a defense. 5 In such situations, a
plaintiff's alleged culpability typically ranges from negligence
to gross recklessness. In contrast, unless otherwise indicated,
the phrases "in pari delicto" and "in paridelicto context" refer
to situations in which a defense is based on allegations that a
plaintiff's conduct has threatened or caused injury to another. 6
the case of Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6,
13 n.9 (1971).
3. For purposes of this Article, the spectrum of undesirable plaintiff conduct includes negligence, gross negligence, recklessness, gross recklessness (including knowing misconduct), and intentional misconduct.
4. In 1976, the Supreme Court decided Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185 (1976). See infra notes 55-64 and accompanying text.
5. As used, these phrases contemplate inquiry into failure to use good (or
any) judgment in evaluating claims, failure to investigate questionable claims,
failure to take advantage of readily available opportunities to investigate
claims not questionable on their face, and the like. For a discussion of the tendency of courts to describe at least the latter elements of this spectrum in
terms of due care or due diligence, see infra notes 38-49 & 74-77 and accompanying text.
6. A plaintiff's justifiable reliance may or may not be called into question
at the same time. See infra text accompanying and following note 175.
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In such situations, a plaintiff's alleged culpability may vary
from negligence to intentional wrongdoing.
I.

THE TRADITIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF PLAINTIFF
CONDUCT IN RULE 10b-5 CASES

A. A PLAiNTIFF'S JUSTIFIABLE RELIANCE
Courts have tended to agree that in a misrepresentation
case under Rule 10b-5, a plaintiff generally must establish that,
in connection with the purchase or sale of a security, the 7defendant, (1) with scienter, (2) made a false representation of
(3) a material fact, (4) upon which the plaintiff justifiably relied
9
(5) to his or her detriment.8 Although not conclusive, resort
10 has provided
by the courts to the common law tort of deceit
substantial guidance to the development of these five elements.1 The deceit cause of action has particularly influenced
7. Although Rule 10b-5 has been applied to hold a defendant liable for
either a false representation or an omission of a material fact, see, e.g., Speed v.
Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 828-29 (D. Del. 1951); 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1439 (2d ed. 1961), this Article will refer solely to the former. This simplification does not distort the impact of the discussion.
8. See, e.g., Zobrist v. Coal-X, Inc., 708 F.2d 1511, 1516 (10th Cir. 1983);
Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1014 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 434 U.S. 911
(1977); Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 694 (10th Cir. 1976) (en banc), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977). Some courts require that plaintiff establish justifiable reliance (in some cases phrased as due diligence) as an element separate
from actual reliance. See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
9. See Note, The Reliance Requirement in Private Actions Under SEC
Rule 10b-5, 88 HARV. L. REV. 584, 585 n.7 (1975) (noting that "the fraud provisions in the SEC acts... are not limited to circumstances which would give
rise to a common law action for deceit" (quoting 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1435 (2d ed. 1961))).
10. Prosser lists the elements of an action for deceit: (1) a false representation made by the defendant; (2) defendant's knowledge or belief that the
representation is false or defendant's lack of a sufficient basis of information
to make the representation (scienter); (3) an intention by the defendant to induce the plaintiff to act or refrain from acting in reliance on the niisrepresentation; (4) justifiable reliance on the representation by the plaintiff in acting or
refraining from action; and (5) damage to the plaintiff due to such reliance.
PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 105, at 728 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter
PROssER].

11. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 744
(1975); Dupuy, 551 F.2d at 1018; List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d
Cir.), cert denied sub nom. List v. Lerner, 382 U.S. 811 (1965); 3 L. Loss, supra
note 7, at 1759-63; 6 id, at 3880 (2d ed. Supp. 1969); Wheeler, PlaintiffsDuty of
Due Care Under Rule 10b-5: An Implied Defense to an Implied Remedy, 70
Nw. U.L. REV. 561, 575 (1975); Comment, Negligent MisrepresentationsUnder
Rule 10b-5, 32 U. CH. L. REv. 824, 828-33 (1965).
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development of the requirement that a successful plaintiff
show justifiable reliance on the alleged misrepresentation.
1.

The State of the Law Before Hochfelder: Common Law
Roots and Doctrinal Disparities

a.

Causation,Actual Reliance and JustifiableReliance

In Rule 10b-5 actions, as in actions for deceit, the reliance
requirement is viewed by courts as a crucial element in establishing that a plaintiff's injury was caused by a defendant's misconduct. 12 Causation "in fact" is lacking if a plaintiff's actions
would have been no different had the defendant's misconduct
not occurred.' 3 Under such circumstances, the plaintiff is
barred from recovering any damages on the theory that such
damages would constitute an impermissible windfall. 14
The logic of the requirement that a plaintiff must have actually relied on the defendant's misrepresentation in order to
recover has obvious appeal. To recover, however, a plaintiff
must also prove that reliance on the defendant's misrepresentation was justifiable. 5 Respectively, the terms "actual reliance"
12. See, e.g., Lipton v. Documation, Inc., 734 F.2d 740, 742 (11th Cir. 1984),
cert, denied 469 U.S. 1132 (1985); Wilson v. Comtech Telecommunications
Corp., 648 F.2d 88, 92 (2d Cir. 1981); Dupuy, 551 F.2d at 1016; List 340 F.2d at
462; Note, PlaintiffsStandard of CareAfter Hocbfelder: Toward a Theory of
Causation, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1225, 1226 (1978).

13. Cf. Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167, 1172 (2d Cir. 1970)
(causation in fact present because plaintiff relied on defendant's representations in purchase of securities); Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419

F.2d 787, 797 (2d Cir. 1969) (defendant's conduct must be substantial factor in
causing plaintiff's injury), cert denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970).
14. See, e.g., Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostook R.R.,
417 U.S. 703, 711 (1974); Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402, 410 (3d Cir.
1974); List, 340 F.2d at 463. This might be the case, for instance, if a plaintiff
had already made a decision to invest in a particular security before receiving
glowing, although untrue, investment information from the defendant. This
assumes, of course, that the additional information did not simply conceal a
negative state of affairs.
15. Although the term "justifiable" is used in this Article, courts sometimes employ the term "reasonable" to describe the same concept. See, e.g.,
Niedermeyer v. Niedermeyer, [1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
94,123, at 94,500 (D. Or. Aug. 21, 1973); cf infra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
A less popular alternative approach to examination of the plaintiff's justifiable reliance is to vary the defendant's duty of disclosure by limiting the duty
to those facts that the plaintiff could not have independently discovered
through reasonable investigation. A defendant's duty under this alternative
thus varies with the extent of a plaintiff's knowledge or access to knowledge.
See, e.g., White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 730-36 (9th Cir. 1974); Note, supra
note 12, at 1232, 1236.
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and "justifiable reliance" generally refer to whether a plaintiff
actually relied on a misrepresentation and whether reliance in
such a case satisfies a given court's standard for suitable plaintiff conduct.
b. Refining the Doctrine of JustifiableReliance
i. The Deceit Analogy
For purposes of the tort of deceit, a plaintiff's reliance is
deemed to be unjustified, and thus operates as a potential bar
to recovery, in two situations.' 6 First, reliance is regarded as
unjustified if the misrepresentation allegedly relied upon is
known to be, or is obviously, false. 17 For example, suppose that
defendant, who sells securities issued by a corporation operating a chain of hamburger stands, tells plaintiff purchaser that
the National Hamburger Association soon will announce the results of a scientific study proving that eating burgers leads to
immortality. Plaintiff's reliance on the statement would be regarded as unjustified.
The second situation in which reliance is deemed not justified for purposes of the law of deceit involves the making of an
immaterial misrepresentation.' 8 Thus, if the seller had simply
overstated by one the number of burgers sold by the chain in
the previous year, or had misrepresented the color of his own
eyes, the plaintiff presumably would be precluded, as a matter
of law, from claiming that he would have decided not to acquire
19
the corporation's securities had the truth been known.
16. The older common law approach to reasonable reliance was somewhat
more severe than the current state of the law reflected in this Article. Thus, it
was said that
[w]hen the means of knowledge are open and at hand or furnished to
the purchaser or his agent and no effort is made to prevent the party
he will not be heard to say that he has been
from using them ....
deceived to his injury by the misrepresentations of the vendor.
Shappirio v. Goldberg, 192 U.S. 232, 241-42 (1904). See also Crane, An Analysis of Causation Under Rule 10b-5, 9 SEC. REG. L.J. 99, 111 n.51 (1981) (citing
cases in which courts, in the past, have considered whether plaintiff's reliance
was justified).
17. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 541 (1965); PROSSER, supra note
10, § 108, at 750-55.
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538 (1965); PROSSER, supra note

10, § 108, at 753-54.

19. Because materiality of the defendant's misrepresentation is put in issue by the specific terms of Rule 10b-5 itself, however, it is generally dealt
with as a separate matter in Rule lOb-5 cases rather than as part of the doctrine of justifiable reliance. See Rule lOb-5 supra note 1. But see, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 152-54 (1972) (holding that
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The standard imposed under the common law of deceit to
determine whether a plaintiff justifiably relied on a given misrepresentation is not demanding. 20 The plaintiff need only refrain from relying on misrepresentations that "any such normal

person would recognize ... as preposterous, ... or which are
...so patently and obviously false that [the plaintiff] must have
closed his eyes to avoid discovery of the truth .
,," The

plaintiff is not required to act with the prudence of the hypothetical reasonable person.22 Rather, the plaintiff's conduct is
judged by reference to the reasonable actions of a person endowed with those attributes of the plaintiff that are known to
the defendant and that the defendant has sought to exploit.2 3
The justifiable reliance requirement has been explained as
a means of dealing both with the practical difficulty of proving
that actual reliance occurred in unlikely circumstances and
with the corresponding possibility that a plaintiff fraudulently
may allege reliance on a belief that the allegation cannot be disproved. 2 4 Thus, in cases where a plaintiff has alleged actual but
absurd reliance (such as reliance on a statement that hamburgers confer immortality), the requirement allows the court to resolve the case without assessing the plaintiff's credibility. In
such circumstances, the law simply refuses to countenance the
plaintiff's claim. Justifiable reliance, as a mechanism to avoid
credibility issues, is valued by courts both as a judicial timesaver and as a device to eliminate the possibility of erroneous
findings of reliance (and thus causation) in those cases where a
plaintiff's reliance is deemed inherently unbelievable.
under circumstances involving primarily a failure to disclose, proof of reliance

was unnecessary where the omitted facts were material); see also infra note
102 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's substitution of duty and

failure to disclose material fact for reliance to establish cause-in-fact in 4ffiliated Ute Citizens). For a discussion of the general relationship between materiality and reliance, see Crane, supra note 16, at 101 n.4.
20. See Whalen, Causation and Reliance in Private Actions Under SEC
Rule 10b-5, 13 PAc. L.J. 1003, 1013 (1982). It also has been said that "[t]he
plaintiff's conduct must not be so utterly unreasonable, in the light of the information apparent to him, that the law may properly say that his loss is his
own responsibility." PROSSER, supra note 10, § 108, at 750.
21. Id.
22. See PROSSER, supra note 10, § 108, at 751 (The law is intended to "protect the weak and credulous" from the "artful and cunning" and a reasonable
person standard would not accomplish this.).
23. Id.; but cf Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402, 409-10 (3d Cir. 1974)
(plaintiff must fulfill duty of due care before claiming reliance).
24. Whalen, supra note 20, at 1013; Harper & McNeely, A Synthesis of the
Law of Misrepresentation,22 MINN. L. REV. 939, 943 (1938).
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The justifiability requirement also is viewed by courts as a
"limitation... which insures that there is a causal connection
between the misrepresentation and the plaintiff's harm." 25 According to this view, the justifiable reliance requirement operates to increase the likelihood that recovery will never occur
without such a connection by barring recovery in situations
where it is possible, but unlikely, that a causal connection does
exist.
ii.

Objective and Subjective Standards

Because courts have placed so much importance on a plaintiff's obligation to establish a causal connection between defendant's misrepresentation and plaintiff's harm, a primary
consideration in determining whether a plaintiff should be
barred from recovery appears to be the likelihood that the
plaintiff's claim of actual reliance is true. Logically, the point
at which a plaintiff's reliance is deemed unjustifiable should reflect a finding that, in all probability, the plaintiff did not actually rely. A more stringent test for determining unjustifiability
will presumably reflect a relatively low degree of tolerance for
a false finding of actual reliance. One way to increase the stringency of the test is to apply an objective standard of conduct to
the plaintiff's claim of justifiable reliance. Thus, if a plaintiff
were only permitted to claim reliance on a misrepresentation
that would have been believed by a reasonable person, more recoveries would be precluded than if plaintiff were permitted to
claim reliance on any misrepresentation that would be believed
by a reasonable person with the plaintiff's own attributes.
As noted above, the tort law standard for justifiable reliance has been stated in terms of the attributes of the plaintiff
known to and sought to be exploited by the defendant. 2 6
Before the Supreme Court's well-known 1976 decision in Ernst
& Ernst v. Hochfelder,27 however, courts often defined the
plaintiff's standard of care in Rule 10b-5 cases by reference to
25. Zobrist v. Coal-X, Inc., 708 F.2d 1511, 1516 (10th Cir. 1983); cf Crane,
supra note 16, at 111-20 (1980) (noting that the securities acts were intended to
provide investors with equal access to information, not with "a scheme of investor insurance"). As noted above, the need to establish a causal connection
between the defendant's misrepresentation and the plaintiff's harm also is the
primary rationale for the requirement of actual reliance in both the deceit and
Rule 10b-5 contexts. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
26. See supra text accompanying note 23.
27. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
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the care of the "reasonable investor," 28 and discussions of objective standards of reasonable conduct were common.2 9 The analysis that courts invoked resembled, and sometimes was referred
to as, contributory negligence. 30
At least two rationales support the adoption of a contributory negligence approach to justifiable reliance. The first rationale is deterrence of investor carelessness 31 and the second is
a desire to limit the number of Rule 10b-5 suits.32 Interestingly, neither of these rationales is related to a concern with
avoiding false findings of reliance.
Despite the general tendency of pre-Hochfelder courts to
invoke an ostensibly objective standard for measuring plaintiff
conduct, a number of such courts actually paid close attention
to the knowledge and sophistication of the individual plaintiff
and to the factual context in which the disputes arose.3 3 Thus,
whereas an objective standard would focus on what a reasonable investor would do in similar circumstances, 3 4 these courts
in effect asked what was reasonable for the particular plaintiff,
28. See, e.g., Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402, 408 (3d Cir. 1974);
Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 604 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 873 (1974); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1301-02 (2d Cir.
1973); Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 97 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971); City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221, 230-31
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970); Allen Organ Co. v. North Am.
Rockwell Corp., 363 F. Supp. 1117, 1127 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Niedermeyer v.
Niedermeyer, [1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) %94,123, at
94,500 (D. Or. Aug. 21, 1973). Cf. SEC v. Dolnick, 501 F.2d 1279, 1283 (7th Cir.
1974) ("It is of course immaterial that [claimant] might have been a knowledgeable investor.").
29. See, e.g., Clement A. Evans & Co. v. McAlpine, 434 F.2d 100, 103-04
(5th Cir. 1970), cert denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971); Vanderboom, 422 F.2d at 230
n.10.
30. See Crane, supra note 16, at 112; Wheeler, supra note 11, at 568; Note,
supra note 9, at 604. Observe, however, that this identification occurred in the
context of cases articulating a due diligence requirement. See infra text accompanying notes 38-44. But see, e.g., Carroll v. First Nat'l Bank, 413 F.2d 353,
358 (7th Cir. 1969) (declining to apply the doctrine of contributory negligence
to dismiss plaintiff's case), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1003 (1970).
31. See Note, supra note 9, at 604.
32. Cf. Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 804-05 & n.12 (5th Cir. 1970) (recognizing the need to limit the scope of liability).
33. See Wheeler, supra note 11, at 600; Note, supra note 12, at 1235.
34. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552A (1977) (establishing contributory negligence as a defense to negligent misrepresentation). According
to comment a, "It]his means that the plaintiff is held to the standard of care,
knowledge, intelligence, and judgment of a reasonable man, even though he
does not possess the qualities necessary to enable him to conform to that standard." Id. § 552A comment a.
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given all the circumstances peculiar to the plaintiff. 35 Some
courts that adopted this approach specifically stated that the
test for justifiable reliance was a subjective one.3 6 Several commentators articulated that the appropriate inquiry was whether
the plaintiff subjectively knew, understood, and appreciated the
risk that a defendant's statement was untrue but nonetheless
37
proceeded in the face of that risk.
iii. Expanding the JustifiabilityRequirement: Due Diligence
During the pre-Hochfelder era, courts applying Rule 10b-5
often analyzed the justifiable reliance requirement in terms of
whether the plaintiff had exercised "due diligence" or "due
care."38 These courts required that a plaintiff seeking redress
under the Rule show that she took appropriate self-protective
measures during the investment process. 39 This due diligence
requirement was found in appropriate circumstances to encom35. See, e.g., Clement A. Evans & Co. v. McAlpine, 434 F.2d 100, 103 (5th
Cir. 1970), cert denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971); City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom,
422 F.2d 221, 230 n.10 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970).
Note, however, that "general and particularized standards can... blend
into one another, depending on how many characteristics one chooses to incorporate in a model of the 'reasonable investor."' Note, supra note 9, at 603
n.87. See generally Seavey, Negligence-Subjective or Objective?, 41 HARV. L.
REv. 1 (1927) (discussing the pertinence of individual characteristics in determining whether conduct is negligent).
36. See, e.g., Clement A. Evans & Co., 434 F.2d at 102; Myzel v. Fields, 386
F.2d 718, 737 (8th Cir. 1967), cert denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968).
37. See, e.g., Wheeler, supra note 11, at 600; Note, supra note 12, at 1253.
38. For example, Wheeler, supra note 11, at 574, as of 1975, asserts that
"[w]hile framed in a variety of ways, a duty of due care has been imposed on
10b-5 claimants in eight courts of appeals."
39. Thus, in Vanderboom, 422 F.2d at 230 n.10, the court imposed a "duty
of reasonable investigation"; accord Vohs v. Dickson, 495 F.2d 607, 623 (5th Cir.
1974).
The due diligence requirement was most often cited in cases involving sophisticated or inside investors. E.g., Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 692
(10th Cir. 1976) (citing earlier cases and stating that "[w]here the due diligence
standard is applied it requires insiders or sophisticated investors who have access to information to take positive steps to ascertain the facts for themselves"), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977). For an interesting discussion
concluding that, pre-Hochfelder, such measures were required only in cases
"purporting to reject a Rule 10b-5 scienter requirement... [or cases] in which
the plaintiff was a securities professional, a corporation, or an insider," see
Sachs, The Relevance of Tort Law Doctrines to Rule 10b-5: Should Careless
Plaintiffs Be Denied Recovery?, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 96, 105-106 (1985) (footnotes omitted). See also Note, supra note 12, at 1231 ("Although the formulations apply theoretically to any 10b-5 case, the actual decisions have dealt with
close corporations and opposing parties who are related or well-known to each
other much more often than open-market transactions.")

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:317

pass actions such as the reading of a prospectus 40 or the exami41
nation of accessible company records.
The responsibility imposed by this standard clearly required that plaintiffs do more than simply not ignore the obvious.42 As a conceptual matter, then, courts that required due
diligence could not find a plaintiff's actual reliance to be justified unless the plaintiff had exercised the requisite amount of
diligence. 43 As a result, although courts that imposed a requirement of due diligence sometimes superficially separated that
requirement from the requirement of justifiable reliance, the
due diligence requirement in fact simply was incorporated into
the test for justifiable reliance. 44
Courts that adopted the expanded due diligence requirement clearly contemplated different levels of responsibility in
different circumstances. Thus, courts have said that, under the
due diligence requirement, the plaintiff's conduct is to be measured against that of a reasonable investor with the attributes
45
of the plaintiff rather than against an objective standard.
Such courts, nonetheless, have sometimes characterized the requirement as a negligence standard.46 As such, the due diligence requirement has been justified as a deterrent of investor
carelessness and a limit on the number of Rule 10b-5 suits.4 7
Although some courts have employed a negligence standard to assess a plaintiff's deviation from ideal conduct (de40. See, e.g., Lucas v. Florida Power & Light Co., 575 F. Supp. 552, 570
(S.D. Fla. 1983), affd, 765 F.2d 1039 (11th Cir. 1985).
41. See, e.g., Frigitemp Corp. v. Financial Dynamics Fund, Inc., 524 F.2d
275, 282 (2d Cir. 1975) (failure to examine transfer sheets); Kaplan v. Vornado,
Inc., 341 F. Supp. 212, 215 (N.D. Ill. 1971) (failure to read debenture).
42. But cf. supra text accompanying note 21 (discussing the less stringent
standard required by the common law tort of deceit).
43. The requirement of due diligence has the effect of charging the plaintiff with constructive knowledge of information that would have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. Cf. Zobrist v. Coal-X, Inc., 708 F.2d
1511, 1518 (10th Cir. 1983) (imputing knowledge of facts in prospectus or like
document to investor); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 736 (8th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968) (charging plaintiff director "with a degree of notice
of those facts which the corporate books and the directors' meetings would
fairly disclose"). Given such constructive knowledge, reliance on conflicting
information given by the defendant is deemed unjustified.
44. Unfortunately, this logical amalgamation was not necessarily perceived by the courts themselves. See infra notes 50-54 and accompanying text
for an indication of the diversity of approaches taken.
45. See, e.g., Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1017 (5th Cir.), cert denied,
434 U.S. 911 (1977).
46. Id.; see also supra note 30 and accompanying text.
47. See supra text accompanying notes 31-32.
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fined to include all appropriate acts of self-protection in a given
case), the use of a negligence standard is not necessarily related
to the definition of ideal conduct. 48 For example, a court could
define ideal conduct to include affirmative acts of investigation
yet bar a plaintiff's recovery only if the plaintiff's conduct constituted a reckless deviation from the established ideal. 49 A
broad definition of what constitutes ideal conduct is related to
the use of a restrictive standard for acceptable deviation from
the ideal to the extent that both may contribute to the goals of
deterring plaintiff carelessness and decreasing the volume of
Rule 10b-5 litigation.
iv. ProceduralApproaches to Proof
A number of courts combined justifiability of reliance,
sometimes referred to as the exercise of due diligence, with actual reliance as a single element of the plaintiff's case. 0 Other
courts dealt with the justifiability concept as a separate element.51 Where the latter approach was adopted, use of due diligence terminology was virtually certain. This was also true in
the case of a third approach which treated lack of due diligence
as an affirmative defense. 52 A fourth approach incorporated
something akin to the justifiability concept into the parameters
of the scope of the defendant's duty to disclose, establishing by
implication that the duty ran only to plaintiffs whose reliance
was justified.53 As might be expected, the use of these varying
approaches and terminologies, together with the inconsistent
use of objective and subjective standards for measuring plaintiff
conduct, resulted in a confusion of the case law.M
48. See infra notes 74-77 & 90-95 and accompanying text.
49. In this case due diligence would consist of whatever acts would enable
the court to say that the investor had not been subjectively reckless.
50. E.g., Thomas v. Duralite Co., 524 F.2d 577, 585-86 (3d Cir. 1975); City
Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221, 230 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S.
905 (1970). A few district courts have dealt with the due diligence concept in
connection with other elements of the plaintiffs case. See Sachs, supra note
39, at 104.
51. E.g., Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402, 409 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 993 (1976); Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 474 F.2d 514, 517 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973).
52. E.g., Clement A. Evans & Co. v. McAlpine, 434 F.2d 100, 104 (5th Cir.
1970), cert denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971).
53. E.g., White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 736 (9th Cir. 1974); Arber v. Essex
Wire Corp., 490 F.2d 414, 420 (6th Cir.), cerft denied, 419 U.S. 830 (1974).
54. These disparate treatments have continued since Hochfelder. See infra note 72.
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2. The Post-HochfelderReassessment
a. Recklessness and ComparativeFault
In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,55 the United States
Supreme Court made it clear that, in bringing suit under Rule
10b-5, a plaintiff was required to show that the defendant acted
with scienter, a state of mind that the Court indicated was
more culpable than negligence. 56 Lower courts have since
struggled with the limits of this rule, particularly in the context
of whether reckless conduct by a defendant is sufficient to constitute scienter.5 7
In addition, the Hochfelder decision prompted lower courts
to re-evaluate decisions that barred contributorily negligent
plaintiffs from recovery. 58 The courts articulated several considerations. First, simple equity seemed to suggest that plaintiffs should not be held to a higher standard of care than that
imposed upon defendants. 59 Second, under the common law,
contributory negligence is generally not a bar to plaintiff recovery in intentional tort cases. 60 Third, the need to limit the vol55. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
56. See id. at 201. The Court noted that
the term "scienter" refers to a mental state embracing intent to
deceive, manipulate or defraud. In certain areas of the law recklessness is considered to be a form of intentional conduct .... We need
not address here the question whether, in some circumstances, reckless behavior is sufficient for civil liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b5.

Id. at 194 n.12.
57. See generally Metzger & Heintz, Hochfelder's Progeny: Implications
for the Auditor, 63 MiNN. L. REV. 79, 90-112 (1978) (discussing the lower federal courts' efforts to define the limits of the scienter element after
Hochfelder); Note, Recklessness Under Section 10(b): Weathering the
Hochfelder Storm, 8 RuT.-CAM. L.J. 325, 349-51 (1977) (examining judicial
treatment of the recklessness standard by post-Hochfelder courts).
58. See, e.g., Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1017 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 911 (1977); Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 597 (3d Cir. 1976);
Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 692 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S.
955 (1977). See also Crane, supra note 16, at 112 (stating that "a number of
circuits have reassessed the need for a due diligence requirement"); Note,
supra note 12, at 1237 (stating that Hochfelder "provoked a reevaluation of decisions perceived to hold plaintiffs to a standard of contributory negligence").
59. See, e.g., Dupuy, 551 F.2d at 1019 (concluding that "[i]f it is fairer for a
judicially allocated loss to fall upon the more culpable actor under tort law,
the judicially created remedial system for the Securities Acts can respond to
similar notions of equity without disrupting the legislative scheme"). But cf
Wheeler, supra note 11, at 586 (stating that "the rationale which underlies the
denial of equitable relief to the plaintiff who has not done equity provides support for the denial of an implied remedy to the careless investor").
60. See, e.g., Dupuy, 551 F.2d at 1018; Holdsworth, 545 F.2d at 694.
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ume of Rule 10b-5 litigation had been alleviated to some extent
by requiring a showing of scienter on the part of defendants,
thus reducing the number of defendants failing to satisfy their
requisite standard of care. 61 Finally, the public policy of deterring investor carelessness was balanced against the clear legislative intent, emphasized in Hochfelder, to deter defendant
conduct involving scienter. This balancing suggested that deterrence of defendant misconduct was the more pressing concern. 62 As a result, post-Hochfelder courts generally have felt
safe in concluding that contributory negligence does not constitute a bar to a plaintiff's recovery. 63 Alternatively, courts have
often stated that plaintiff recklessness, at a minimum, is required for such a bar to be imposed.6

Expanding upon the post-Hochfelder rejection of a negligence standard for plaintiff conduct, some courts have indicated
that a plaintiff will not be foreclosed from recovery unless he
has engaged in "a level of culpable conduct comparable to that
of the defendant's" 65 or "gross conduct somewhat comparable
to that of [the] defendant. '66 Other courts have stated that the
applicable standard of care is one "not exceeding that imposed
on the defendant." 67 Even where language of comparable fault
is lacking, any reference to Hochfelder, which dealt only with
the defendant's standard of care, in the context of analyzing the
plaintiff's standard of care effectively conveys the notion that
the standards of both parties' conduct should be comparable. 68
61.

See, e.g., Dupuy, 551 F.2d at 1019.

62. Id.
63. See, e.g., Mallis v. Bankers Trust Co., 615 F.2d 68, 78 (2d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1123 (1981); Holmes v. Bateson, 583 F.2d 542, 559 & n.21
(1st Cir. 1978). But see Alton Box Bd. Co. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 418 F.
Supp. 1149 (E.D. Mo. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 560 F.2d 916 (8th Cir.
1977). It has been said that this decision represents post-Hochfelder persistence in applying "a varying duty of investigation approach without apparent
concern that [courts] might be using a negligence standard." Note, supra note
12, at 1242.
64. E.g., Zobrist v. Coal-X, Inc., 708 F.2d 1511, 1516 (10th Cir. 1983); Petrites v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 646 F.2d 1033, 1035 (5th Cir. 1981); Paul F.
Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 1111, 1122 (5th Cir. 1980);
Dupuy, 551 F.2d at 1020.
65. See, e.g., Zobrist, 708 F.2d at 1516.
66. See, e.g., Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 693 (10th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977).
67. Dupuy, 551 F.2d at 1020; accord Paul F. Newton & Co., 630 F.2d at
1122.
68. A number of courts have indicated that Hochfelder has provoked a reevaluation of justifiable reliance/due diligence concepts without referring to
rules of equity or culpability comparison. See, e.g., Holmes v. Bateson, 434 F.
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Even where comparisons between parties have been specifically invoked, often it has not been clear whether the court intended to compare the actual culpabilities of the two parties
with each other or to test the conduct of each party against a
separate, but comparable, standard of care. 69 The significance
of this uncertainty can be illustrated by a hypothetical in which
a defendant has engaged in grossly reckless conduct, giving rise
to a suit in a jurisdiction which holds that merely reckless conduct by a defendant satisfies the Hochfelder scienter requirement. In such a case, it is not clear whether intentional or
grossly reckless conduct on the part of the plaintiff will be required before recovery is barred (presumably the result under
the approach comparing actual culpabilities) or if merely reckless conduct on the part of the plaintiff would give rise to such
a bar (as would be the case under an approach comparing standards of care).
Regardless of which of these two approaches is applied, it is
clear that the culpability of the plaintiff is examined only with
respect to the risk to which she exposes herself and not with
respect to the risks to the defendant or third parties. 70 Because
plaintiffs normally do not intentionally inflict economic losses
on themselves, a court requiring a comparison of actual culpabilities would seldom find itself barring recovery where the defendant's misrepresentation was found to be intentional.7 1
Supp. 1365, 1382 (D.R.I. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 583 F.2d 542 (1st Cir.
1978).
69. Discussion of a recklessness standard for plaintiffs in a case involving
alleged intentional misconduct on the part of the defendant suggests the sepa-

rate, comparable standard approach. See, e.g., Gower v. Cohn, 643 F.2d 1146
(5th Cir. 1981); Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
911 (1977). But cf. G.A. Thompson & Co. v. Partridge, 636 F.2d 945 (5th Cir.
1981) (noting that Dupuy applied a recklessness standard, even though the defendant's misrepresentations were held to be intentional, id. at 954 n.16, that a
standard requiring the plaintiff to act more recklessly than the defendant was
too strict, see id., and that the definition of "intentional" should include at
least severe forms of recklessness, id. at 961 & n.32).
70. Risks to the defendant and third parties are discussed only in those
cases in which defenses are raised both on grounds of lack of justifiable reliance/due diligence and on grounds of in pari delicto. In those cases, the discussions of the two doctrines do not overlap. See, e.g., Mallis v. Bankers Trust
Co., 615 F.2d 68, 75-81 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1123 (1981).
71. Intentional risk-taking-that is, acting in the face of a known untruth--as opposed to intentional infliction of self-injury will be described for
this purpose as grossly reckless behavior. Cf. supra note 3.
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The Circuits Distinguish Themselves

Despite the fact that post-Hochfelder courts have regularly
rejected a contributory negligence standard for plaintiffs in
Rule 10b-5 cases, no particular test or single approach has
emerged for identifying the type of plaintiff conduct that will
constitute a bar to recovery.72 Indeed, many courts have even
failed to follow a consistent pattern with respect to their own
precedent. 73 A few courts, however, have managed to take a
relatively clear position as to what constitutes unacceptable
plaintiff conduct. Notable among these is the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Through a series of decisions, the Fifth Circuit has determined that ideal plaintiff conduct is defined in terms of compliance with an obligation of due diligence or due care. 74 Only a
gross departure from this standard will operate as a bar to
plaintiff recovery. 75 A plaintiff has therefore acted with due
care or diligence unless he has departed from the ideal by a
margin that may be characterized as "gross." A gross departure
from the ideal is found only if the plaintiff's conduct was more
culpable than negligence, 76 or if the plaintiff acted "in disregard
of a risk known to him or so obvious that he must be taken to
have been aware of it, and so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow." 77
To determine whether the plaintiff's conduct constitutes a
gross departure from the ideal, the Fifth Circuit has developed
72. Commentators have sought to categorize approaches of postHochfelder courts in a number of ways, including acceptance or rejection of
the duty of due diligence, see Note, supra note 12, at 1238, and choice of recklessness or other terminology in describing the requisite standard of conduct,
see Sachs, supra note 39, at 111-12. It is also possible to categorize the courts'
procedural approaches on the basis of the courts' consideration of the plaintiffs compliance with the related standard. Thus, a court may examine plaintiff's conduct as a separate matter, in conjunction with some other element,
such as reliance or materiality, or as part of the defendant's duty of care. In
addition, courts' procedural approaches may be classified on the basis of allocation of the burdens of production and persuasion. The position of a particular

court may be identifiable with respect to some or all of the categories.
73. See infra notes 85-95 and accompanying text.
74. See Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1014 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 434
U.S. 911 (1977).

75. Siebel v. Scott, 725 F.2d 995, 1000 (5th Cir. 1984), cert denied, 467 U.S.
1242 (1984).
76. See Petrites v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 646 F.2d 1033, 1035 (5th Cir. 1981);
Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 1111, 1122 (5th Cir.
1980); Dupuy, 551 F.2d at 1020.
77. Dupuy, 551 F.2d at 1020 (quoting W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF TORTS § 34, at 185 (1971)).
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a list of factors said to be "beyond the intuitive. ' 78 These factors include "existence of a fiduciary relationship, concealment
of the fraud, opportunity for detection, [plaintiff's] position in
the industry, sophistication and expertise in the financial community.... knowledge of related proceedings... [and] whether
the plaintiff initiated the transaction or pressured for a speedy
resolution. '79 By focusing on the plaintiff's special knowledge,
expertise, and circumstances, the Fifth Circuit has clearly rejected an objective standard for assessing plaintiff conduct.80
In addition to providing a rough outline of what constitutes
ideal plaintiff conduct and providing a checklist of subjective
factors to determine what constitutes a gross departure from
the ideal, the Fifth Circuit has made it clear that the plaintiff
must prove both actual and justifiable reliance in all actions
brought under Rule 10b-5. Thus, "the extent of actual reliance
by the plaintiff on the defendant's statements and the justifiability of the reliance, frequently translated into a requirement
of due diligence by the plaintiff," are distinct matters with respect to which the plaintiff bears separate burdens of produc81
tion and persuasion.
The practical consequence of the Fifth Circuit's separation
of the tests for actual reliance and justifiable reliance is that
even where actual reliance is shown (or, in an increasing
number of cases, presumed 2), a gross departure from ideal conduct may preclude plaintiff recovery. The court has asserted
two policy grounds to justify this result. First, general equitable principles disfavor the use of judicial resources for plaintiffs
who fail to care for themselves.8 3 Second, encouraging plaintiff
care comports with the anti-fraud orientation of the federal se84
curities laws.

As noted above, the case law produced by other jurisdic78. G.A. Thompson & Co. v. Partridge, 636 F.2d 945, 955 (5th Cir. 1981).
79. Id (quoting Clement A. Evans & Co. v. McAlpine, 434 F.2d 100, 102
(5th Cir.), cert denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970)); accord Dupuy, 551 F.2d at 1016
(footnotes omitted).
80. See Dupuy, 551 F.2d at 1016 (stating that "[t]he diligence of the plaintiff in 10b-5 cases is judged subjectively").
81. Id. at 1014 (footnotes omitted). Cf. Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas
Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 1111, 1121-22 (5th Cir. 1980) (discussing the due diligence requirement and citing Dupuy).
82. See infra note 102 and accompanying text. The Dupuy court clearly
was concerned with addressing diligence even where reliance was presumed.
See 551 F.2d at 1015-16.
83. Dupuy, 551 F.2d at 1014.
84. Id.
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tions is less coherent than that generated by the Fifth Circuit.85
This is particularly true of jurisdictions that have refused to articulate the justifiable reliance requirement in terms of due diligence.8 6 For the most part, courts in these jurisdictions have
noted the pre-Hochfeller association of contributory negligence
and due diligence and have perceived that association to be so
87
strong that a rejection of one entails rejection of the other.
They reason that, in the wake of Hochfelder, both concepts
must be discarded. 88
Because the concept of due diligence is simply an extension
of the justifiable reliance requirement, it should logically follow
that courts rejecting a due diligence requirement intend to
adopt a more restrictive view of what the justifiable reliance requirement demands. Presumably, such an approach would
limit the court's concern to whether the plaintiff has ignored
the immediately obvious.8 9 The case law from courts rejecting
due diligence, however, does not reflect this logic. Decisions of
the Second and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeal illustrate this
inconsistency.
The Second Circuit has both rejected a negligence standard
and specifically declined to define justifiable reliance in terms
of the exercise of due diligence. 90 At the same time, however,
the Second Circuit has determined that the failure of a sophisticated investor to make use of available information may consti85. See supra text accompanying note 73.
86. These jurisdictions specifically include the Second, Seventh and Tenth
Circuit Courts of Appeals. See Mallis v. Bankers Trust Co., 615 F.2d 68, 79 (2d
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1123 (1981); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical
Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1048 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977); Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 693 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 955
(1977).
87. Cf. Mallis, 615 F.2d at 78-79 (responding to plaintiff's argument that,
in light of Hochfelder, scrutiny of plaintiff's conduct under a traditional due
diligence-negligence standard is no longer appropriate by holding that plaintiff's burden is met by simply negating recklessness when her conduct is put in
issue by defendant and that plaintiff need not establish due care); Sundstrand,
553 F.2d at 1048 (distinguishing Hochfelder scienter standard from a negligence
standard of liability, where "plaintiff could not claim reliance if he had not exercised due diligence"); Holdsworth,545 F.2d at 693 (doubting the usefulness of
due diligence defense where, under Hochfelder, plaintiff must prove that defendant's conduct was intentional because plaintiff's burden would be so great
that the action would lie only in an extraordinary case).
88. Cf. cases cited supra note 87.
89. See infra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
90. See Mallis, 615 F.2d at 79 ("[A] plaintiff's burden is simply to negate
recklessness when the defendant puts that in issue, not to establish due care."
(footnote omitted)).
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tute sufficient recklessness to bar recovery. 91 To the extent
that the investor's failure was described in terms of failure to
take self-protective acts, rather than in terms of ignoring obvious information, the Second Circuit seems to have accomplished little by its rejection of due diligence terminology.
The Tenth Circuit has'similarly rejected the concept of due
diligence, 92 but has retained the requirement that a plaintiff's
reliance be justifiable. 93 To assess the justifiability of the plaintiff's reliance, the Tenth Circuit has adopted the same factors
used by the Fifth Circuit in assessing due diligence. 94 Curiously, although the Tenth Circuit has expressly relied on Fifth
Circuit precedent for its approach, it has failed to note the association between the Fifth Circuit approach and the concept of
due diligence. 95
The confusion generated by the Second and Tenth Circuit
opinions stems from their failure to distinguish, as the Fifth
Circuit has done, what an ideal (or diligent) plaintiff should
have done for self-protection in a given situation and what
deviation (negligent or otherwise) from that ideal the court is
willing to tolerate. 96 This failure has produced undesirable results. One result has been the melding of the concepts of actual
reliance and justifiable reliance into a single element of a Rule
10b-5 action. 97 This melding has, in turn, resulted in a qualita91. Cf.id. at 78-79, in which the court discussed the case of Hirsch v. du
Pont, 553 F.2d 750, 762-63 (2d Cir. 1977), and limited the statement made in
Hirsch that "[sophisticated businessmen] must, if they wish to recover under
federal law, investigate the information available to them with the care and
prudence expected from people blessed with full access to information" to
cases with similar facts. Mallis, 615 F.2d at 79. The Mallis court noted that, in
Hirsch, "the comptroller of a large New York stock brokerage firm contemplating merger with another had received an answer to a questionnaire from
the latter revealing 'a possible massive capital deficiency' and failed to pursue
the line of inquiry plainly suggested by this. This went far beyond negligence." Id.
92. See Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 694 (10th Cir. 1976) ("[D]ue
diligence is totally inapposite in the context of intentional conduct required to
be proved under Rule 10b-5."), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977).
93. See id. ("Plaintiff must show that he relied on the misrepresentations
and that the reliance was justifiable.... And a plaintiff may not reasonably or
justifiably rely on a misrepresentation where its falsity is palpable.").
94. See Zobrist v. Coal-X, Inc., 708 F.2d 1511, 1516 (10th Cir. 1983).
95. See, e.g., id.
96. For clarity, courts also should address the question whether the tolerable deviation is to be measured by reference to a subjective or objective standard. See supra notes 33-37 & 78-80 and accompanying text. Failure to make
this distinction, however, probably is not related to the confusion under
discussion.
97. No court rejecting the concept of due diligence appears to require that
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tive loss of coherence that becomes particularly evident when
the opinions of the Second and Tenth Circuits are compared to
the two-element approach used by the Fifth Circuit.98
3.

Analysis of the Policies Underlying the Justifiable
Reliance Requirement: Is There a Continued Need?

a.

The Call for Re-examination

Despite the fact that courts have labored for years over the
justifiable reliance requirement, the current limits and vitality
of the concept are unclear.9 9 This state of affairs may reflect
judicial apathy toward the policy goals traditionally thought to
form the basis of the requirement. It also is possible that other
devices have been developed to achieve these same goals. In
either case, a re-examination of traditional policy justifications
for the justifiable reliance requirement leads to the conclusion
that abandonment or modification of the requirement would be
appropriate.
b.

EncouragingCarefor Reasons of Credibilityand Cause

The justifiable reliance requirement was initially adopted,
at least in part, to facilitate proof of actual reliance. 10 0 By imposing the requirement, courts and juries are spared the difficulty of testing the credibility of the plaintiff's claim in those
instances in which that claim is based on a contention that
plaintiff acted absurdly. Thus, if the justifiable reliance requirement were abandoned, courts and juries would be forced
the justifiability of reliance be addressed separately from the question of
whether reliance actually occurred. Contrast, for example, the statement in
Zobrist, 708 F.2d at 1516, that "[i]n a misrepresentation case under Rule 10b-5,
a plaintiff generally must establish that... the plaintiff justifiably relied to his
or her detriment" with the following statement in Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d
1005 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 434 U.S. 911 (1977):
The courts have established that with regard to private recovery for
the violation of Rule 10b-5, a properly stated cause of action must establish ... the extent of actual reliance by the plaintiff on the defendant's statements, and the justifiability of the reliance, frequently
translated into a requirement of due diligence by the plaintiff....
This Court established "due diligence" as a separate element in 10b-5
cases, apart from questions of materiality, reliance, or defendant's

duties.
I&i at 1014 (footnotes omitted) (citing Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687 (10th
Cir. 1976)).

98. The Fifth Circuit's approach also has been specifically adopted by the
Eleventh Circuit. See White v. Sanders, 689 F.2d 1366, 1367 (11th Cir. 1982).
99. Cf infra text accompanying note 117.
100. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
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to determine the veracity of apparently incredible factual
claims. This would increase the risk that plaintiffs would recover even though they did not actually rely and even though
their injuries had no "but for" relationship to a specific defendant's actions.
There are, however, at least two responses to the argument
that the justifiable reliance requirement is necessary to simplify the assessment of credibility and buttress the requirement
of cause-in-fact. First, it is quite possible for factfinders to deal
with credibility issues. Evidence of the absurdity of a plaintiff's
alleged reliance may suffice to resolve the matter of the plaintiff's credibility. Obviously, in such cases the existence of the
justifiable reliance test removes the burden of assessing credibility at all, but the resulting increase in litigation efficiency is
probably not sufficient to sustain the requirement. Moreover,
in view of the difficulty courts have encountered in applying
the justifiable reliance analysis, it is impossible to say whether
eliminating the requirement, and thus increasing the potential
difficulty faced by courts with respect to credibility issues,
would lead to more or less efficient administration of Rule 10b5 cases.
The second rationale for maintaining justifiable reliance as
a requirement in Rule 10b-5 litigation is that it assists in proving a causal relationship between the defendant's actions and
the plaintiff's injury. Proof of a causal relationship may not,
however, be an important end in itself. There are several reasons for this position, the most important of which is an increasing judicial tolerance for short-cutting the requirement of
factual causation. This was manifested, for instance, in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, °10 a Rule 10b-5 case in which
the Supreme Court held that, in some rather loosely defined
circumstances, actual reliance need not be proved in order to
establish the requisite of cause-in-fact. 102
101. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).

102. The Court held that,
under the circumstances of this case, involving primarily a failure to
disclose, positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery.

All that is necessary is that the facts withheld be material in the

sense that a reasonable investor might have considered them important in the making of this decision.... This obligation to disclose and
this withholding of a material fact establish the requisite element of

causation in fact.

Id. at 153-54. Similar manifestations, also in the Rule 10b-5 context, appear in
a line of cases permitting recovery on the basis of a "fraud on the market" theory. See generally Note, The Fraudon the Market Theory, 95 HARV. L. REV.

1986]

PLAINTIFF CONDUCT IN 10b-5 ACTIONS

337

In view of the trend illustrated by the Supreme Court in
Affiliated Ute Citizens, some courts have required that justifiable reliance be made a separate element of the plaintiff's case
on the ground that it is desirable to maintain control over
plaintiff conduct, even though actual reliance may fall by the
wayside. 10 3 Courts adopting this view require that plaintiffs
who are relieved of proving actual reliance must nonetheless
demonstrate that their conduct conformed to some minimum
standard of care. In such cases, the justifiable reliance requirement has clearly taken on a function completely independent
of proving cause-in-fact.
The substantial body of commentary on the nature of cause
as an element of the plaintiff's case further indicates that the
requirement of causation is of decreasing importance. Some
commentators have recognized that the requirement, as applied, actually reflects a number of policy-related building
blocks. 10 4 For purposes of tort law, such building blocks have
been formalized by the judiciary in the requirement of causein-law (sometimes referred to as legal or proximate cause). L05
Unfortunately, judicial discussion of the causation requirement
in Rule 10b-5 cases has seldom achieved this level of legal
sophistication.
1143 (1982) (discussing concept of plaintiff's right to recover based on reliance
on the integrity of the market and recommending limitation of theory to developed markets); Note, Fraud on the Market: An Emerging Theory of Recovery Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 50 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 627 (1982) (supporting
adoption of the theory and contending that it will not result in uncontrolled
litigation). Of special interest are cases permitting recovery by plaintiffs who
trade in a market in which an insider with material undisclosed information is
trading concurrently. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974) (where defendent sold stock based on
inside information while failing to notify public). For a discussion of insider
trading and efforts to control it, see Wang, Tradingon MaterialNonpublic Information on Impersonal Stock Markets: Who is Harmed, and Who Can Sue
Whom Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 1217 (1981).
Examples of relaxation of the plaintiff's burden to demonstrate cause certainly also exist outside of the Rule 1Ob-5 context. See, e.g., PROSSER, supra
note 10, § 41, at 271-72 (discussing "clearly established double fault and alternative liability" cases).
103. See, e.g., Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1015-16 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 434 U.S. 911 (1977). See also supra text accompanying notes 82-84.
104. See, e.g., Whalen, supra note 20, at 1009-10.
105. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965) (An actor's negligence is a legal cause of harm if his conduct is a substantial factor in
bringing about the harm and there is no exculpatory rule of law.); PROSSER,
supra note 10, § 42, at 272-73 (same). For an argument that even the requirement of cause-in-fact has policy aspects, see infra notes 108-113 and accompanying text.
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Lack of'judicial analysis notwithstanding, the justifiable reliance analysis in Rule 10b-5 cases effectively operates as a policy-based inquiry into whether the plaintiff's conduct has
conformed to a certain standard of care.10 6 Only if a given standard is met will a court, as a matter of law, permit a finding
that the plaintiff's actual reliance on the defendant's misstatements constitutes a link in the chain of causation. Conversely,
when the plaintiff's conduct falls short of that standard, a
court's refusal to impose liability on the defendant comprises a
policy determination that the plaintiff should be held responsible for resulting injury regardless of whether the defendant
committed a wrong contributing to that injury. Viewed in this
light, the justifiable reliance requirement combines two arguably conflicting elements: a concern for preserving integrity in
the cause-in-fact analysis, and a policy determination that if the
plaintiff's conduct is sufficiently defective, the plaintiff's recovery should be barred even if the defendant played a part in the
chain of events leading to the plaintiff's harm.10 7
The commentators in support of the cause-in-fact requirement have failed to reach a consensus on the justification for
the requirement.1 0 s They have, however, tended to agree that
cause-in-fact is difficult, if not impossible, to prove10 9 and that
the more important policies to be served by maintaining the
causal requirement11 0 are better dealt with by inquiry into the
106.

See Note, supra note 12, at 1237, 1252-53.

107. For a discussion of factors involved in this policy determination, see
infra notes 114-123 and accompanying text.
108. Compare Calabresi, ConcerningCause and the Law of Torts: An Essay
for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. CmI. L. REV. 69, 85 (1975) ("[IThe but for requirement, far from being the essential, almost categorical imperative it is sometimes described to be, is simply a useful way of toting up some of the costs the
cheapest cost avoider should face in deciding whether avoidance is worthwhile.") with Chapman, Ethical Issues in the Law of Tort, 20 U.W. ONTARIO L.
REV. 1, 6 (1982) ("[Alspects of the retributive theory [of tort liability] seem[ ]
to loom large in explaining the legal concern for cause-in-fact.") and Zwier,
"Cause in Fact" in Tort Law - A Philosophicaland HistoricalExamination,31
DE PAUL L. REV. 769, 784 (1982) ("ITihe cause in fact requirement can be
traced to the desire for vengeance.").
109. Cf. 13 W. MALONE & A. JOHNSON, LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE,
WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 251, at 546 (2d ed. 1980)
(maintaining that the fact of causation can never be proved absolutely, but
only as a matter of probability).
110. Such policies include the policy of establishing at least some limit on
defendant's liability so that a single "bad" act does not give rise to an endless
obligation (which would both offend the sensibilities and tend to discourage
such acts even in situations where they might have net social benefits) and the
policy of permitting defendants to assess the social costs and benefits of their
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defendant's creation of risk.:"' If this is the case, it seems unnecessary to insist that the requirement of cause be safeguarded by requiring the plaintiff to prove both actual and
justifiable reliance. In light of the dispute as to the value of requiring the plaintiff to prove cause, the causal requirement
would seem to be adequately protected by the requirement of
actual reliance alone. 1'2 After all, even if the justifiability reacts before undertaking them. In fact, these policies can be served quite satisfactorily by holding defendants responsible for all losses that are reasonably
foreseeable consequences of their actions, rather than for all losses that those
actions cause. See generally Note, When Cause-in-Factis More Than a Fact:
The Malone-Green Debate on the Role of Policy in DeterminingFactual Causation in Tort Law, 44 LA. L. REV. 1519 (1984) (discussing and supporting Professor Wex Malone's normative approach to cause-in-fact over the atomistic
cause theory of Dean Leon Green in Louisiana tort law duty-risk analysis).
Although the liability of Rule 10b-5 defendants usually has not been directly
analyzed in terms of foreseeability, there are suggestions of such an analysis in
the "in connection with," materiality, and scienter requirements of the Rule.
A few courts have described the defendant's duty in terms of the diligence
that the court would exact from the plaintiff. Thus, in Arber v. Essex Wire
Corp., the court held that
an insider has no affirmative duty to direct a seller's attention to all
routine data commonly found in the statements and books of the corporation, at least where that information is readily available; the outsider has knowledge that it is available and makes no inquiry; and the
information thus available is not of an unusual or extraordinary
nature.
490 F.2d 414, 420 (6th Cir. 1974). See also Hughes v. Dempsey-Tegeler & Co.,
534 F.2d 156, 176 (9th Cir. 1976) ("The extent of [defendant's] duty must be determined according to [our established] flexible, duty-oriented approach to
Rule 10(b)-5 . . . ."); White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 736 (9th Cir. 1974) (de-

fendant's duty to the plaintiff investor depends on the nature of their relationship). Where that approach is taken, if defendant has fulfilled her duty, the
court is not concerned with plaintiff's care. If defendant's duty has not been
fulfilled, the subject of plaintiff's conduct can be raised. In such situations,
cause-in-fact (and, consequently, justifiable reliance) should be less sacrosanct.
111. See, e.g., Robinson, Multiple Causationin Tort Law: Reflections on the
DES Cases, 68 VA. L. REv. 713, 739 (1982). For purposes of this Article, it is not
important to distinguish between formulations using foreseeability, proximate
cause and duty-risk terminology. For more extensive treatment of the distinctions among these concepts, see generally Calabresi, supra note 108; Thode,
Tort Analysis: Duty-Risk v. Proximate Cause and the RationalAllocation of
Functions Between Judge and Jury, 1977 UTAH L. REV. 1; Note, supra note
110. Apologies are offered for this somewhat cursory treatment of a complex
and interesting area.
112. Although the author doubts the utility of causal requirements in Rule
10b-5 actions, demonstration of that point is beyond the scope of this Article.
One argument favoring maintenance of such a requirement, however, may be
based on the language of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 28(a), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78bb(a) (1982), which provides that "no person permitted to maintain a suit
for damages under the provisions of this title shall recover ... a total amount
in excess of actual damages on account of the act complained of."
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quirement were entirely elininated, actual reliance, and thus
cause, would still have to be established as a matter of fact, if
113
not of law.
c.

EncouragingSelf-Protective Measuresfor Reasons
Unrelatedto Credibility and Cause

i. Litigation Limitations
The preceding section dealt with the role that justifiable
reliance plays in assisting the finding of causal connection. Justifiable reliance has implications other than those related to the
requirement of cause. The first of these has to do with the volume of Rule 10b-5 litigation. Concern over limiting such litigation was one of the historical underpinnings of the justifiable
reliance doctrine and is a constant theme throughout the development of Rule 10b-5 case law.' 14 Although the Hochfelder scienter requirement has been cited by the judiciary as alleviating
such concerns, : 5 some courts continue to mention the need to
reduce the volume of Rule 10b-5 litigation as a rationale for
adopting the Fifth Circuit's two-element approach for analyzing
plaintiff conduct." 6 As a practical matter, however, few postHochfelder courts have barred a plaintiff's recovery on the
ground that the justifiable reliance requirement has not been
met. 117 In light of this fact, potential plaintiffs should be
neither deterred from bringing, nor encouraged to bring, an action on the basis of the retention or abandonment of the justifiable reliance requirement. Thus, any effect of the requirement
on the volume of litigation is probably quite limited.
113. In those cases where actual reliance is presumed, courts aleady have
freed themselves from the notion that proof of cause is necessary if policy suggests otherwise. See supra text accompanying note 100. This does not, of
course, mean the same result would follow if lack of cause were proved.
114. Cf. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739-49
(1975) (discussing the possibilities of vexatious litigation under Rule 10b-5).

115. E.g., Straub v. Vaisman and Co., 540 F.2d 591, 597 (3d Cir. 1976).

116. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
117. But see Thompson v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 709 F.2d
1413 (11th Cir. 1983) (Plaintiff knew of risks involved in options trading or
with the exercise of reasonable diligence could have discovered risks.); Fallani
v. American Water Corp., 574 F. Supp. 81 (S.D. Fla. 1983) (Plaintiffs failed to
show that they had exercised due diligence in connection with securities transaction.); Meier v. Texas Int'l Drilling Funds, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 1056 (N.D. Cal.
1977) (Investor who has investment experience and access to information sufficient to understand the nature of his investment must exercise reasonable diligence to recover under securities laws.).
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ii. PermittingDisclosure Flexibility
The justifiable reliance requirement also has special implications with respect to the disclosure obligations of defendants
in those situations in which it is foreseeable that the plaintiff
may act with recklessness, gross recklessness, or even deliberate self-destructive intent. The justifiable reliance requirement
permits the defendant's disclosure obligation to be tailored to
each case. 118 Thus, if the potential plaintiff is known to be a sophisticated investor, a seller may assume that the detail and
clarity of the information provided need only meet the needs of
a sophisticated investor acting reasonably or, at worst, negligently. This flexibility has presumably resulted in reduced
costs for the seller, and a portion of the savings generated has
most likely inured to the benefit of investors.
Taken a step further, the argument in support of a potential defendant's ability to disclose only the information required
for a specific investor might lead to the conclusion that if a
plaintiff does not have to prove justifiable reliance, the average
costs of securities offerings might increase. This argument,
however, disregards the cost of the current confusion surrounding the definition of a plaintiff's minimum standard of care.
More importantly, it assumes a sophistication in calculation by
potential defendants that probably does not exist. As a practical matter, then, the effect of the justifiable reliance requirement on the costs of conducting securities transactions is
almost certainly negligible.
iii. Control of PlaintiffConduct
From a theoretical standpoint, the elimination of the justifiable reliance requirement involves a third implication that is
more troubling than those previously discussed. To the extent
that the justifiable reliance requirement is the only control
presently imposed by law on plaintiff conduct not tending to
jeopardize the interests of third parties, 11 9 its abandonment
would operate as a signal to potential plaintiffs that they have
no responsibility for their own protection in those situations
where defendants act with scienter. If plaintiffs were thus encouraged to relax their self-protective vigilance, defendants
would presumably be emboldened to commit wrongdoing. This
118. This tailoring also is facilitated, of course, by the fragmentary foreseeability analysis referred to supra note 110.
119. For reference to doctrines designed to control plaintiff conduct of the
other type, see infra text accompanying notes 125-26.
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reasoning is logical on its face and probably underlies any argument referring to the value of encouraging plaintiff care.1 20
On closer inspection, however, this argument assumes too
much on the part of potential plaintiffs. Essentially, it assumes
that plaintiffs are able to calculate that their own lack of care
will be compensated for by liability on the part of defendants. 121 A plaintiff's ability to detect scienter is also crucial because only where a defendant acts with scienter will recovery
be possible. 22 Thus, the plaintiff would be permitted to rely
upon the existence of an enforceable action under Rule 10b-5
only where a misrepresentation is reasonably obvious. It is unlikely, however, that a plaintiff would make what is probably a
bad investment in the hope of eventually receiving damages
through litigation. Even more far-fetched is any suggestion
that defendants would respond to relaxed plaintiff vigilance by
making more obvious misrepresentations in order to bait potential investors. On balance, then, it seems that eliminating the
justifiable reliance requirement would have little impact on
plaintiff conduct and next to none on that of defendants. 2 3
iv. Inter-PartyEquity
Perhaps the only remaining ramification of eliminating the
justifiable reliance requirement is the effect it would have on
inter-party equity. In the relatively rare situation in which a
defendant acts recklessly and a plaintiff acts with gross recklessness (as might be the case where an insider purchases from
an outsider), application of the justifiable reliance requirement
is currently the only device that may be used to bar the plaintiff's suit and therefore achieve a fair result.
If inter-party fairness is the primary goal to be achieved
through application of the requirement of justifiable reliance,
however, the requirement may be more complicated than it
needs to be. It seems painfully apparent that the extent of in120. See supra text accompanying notes 83-84.
121. An analogous assumption was identified and questioned by the United
States Supreme Court in Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 105 S.
Ct. 2622, 2623 (1985). See infra notes 163-166 and accompanying text.
122. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
123. Accordingly, it may be possible to dispose of arguments related to the
value of plaintiff control without resort to the fiction of legislative intent. Cf.
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975) ("It would be
disingenuous to suggest that either Congress in 1934 or the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1942 foreordained the present state of the law with respect to Rule 10b-5.").
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ter-party fairness realized by the application of the justifiable
reliance requirement could be achieved by some far simpler
comparison of inter-party culpability.
B. THE DEFENSE OF IN PARI DELrCTO
1. Equitable Origins and Traditional Application
As noted above, 124 common law doctrines significantly influenced the development of the elements of a private action
brought under Rule 10b-5. These doctrines also substantially
affected the evolution of the defenses allowable in Rule 10b-5
actions, including several defenses based on the conduct of the
plaintiff.25 These defenses include waiver, estoppel, laches and
in par! delicto (which, literally translated, means "of equal
fault").2

6

The defense of in pari delicto evolved as part of the doctrine of unclean hands.2 7 This doctrine requires that to merit
the extraordinary aid of a court sitting in equity the supplicant
must exhibit "clean hands," free of the taint of inequitable behavior.128 Historically, the defense of in pari delicto was limited to situations involving a wrong committed by the plaintiff
which directly injured the defendant.129 More recently, its application has been extended to cases in which the parties had a
mutual intent to commit the same wrong against one or more
third parties.' 3 0 Some courts even have held the defense to preclude a plaintiff's recovery where the plaintiff was merely
guilty of unlawful or fraudulent conduct in any way connected
3
to his alleged loss.' '

Courts have tended to deny use of the in pari delicto defense in four situations: (1) where the plaintiff is a member of
124. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
125. See Wheeler, supra note 11, at 562.
126. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134,
135 (1968) (holding on unrelated issue limited by Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 777 (1984)).
127. 2 J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 397-398 (5th ed. 1941).
128. Id. § 397. The doctrine of unclean hands ostensibly operates to both
prevent profit from undesirable acts, presumably thus deterring them, and to
permit the court to avoid the appearance of furthering the goals of the unjust.
Note, Rule lOb-5--Application of the In Pari Delicto Defense in Suits Brought
Against Brokers by Customers Who Have Traded on Inside Information, 37

VAND. L. REV. 557, 561 (1984).
129. Comment, Rule 10b-5: The In Pari Delicto and Unclean Hands Defenses, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 1149, 1163 (1970).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1164.
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the class of people that the law seeks to protect by making the
transaction illegal; (2) where the plaintiff acted under fraud or
duress; (3) where the plaintiff did not know that the transaction was illegal; and (4) where the denial of relief to the plaintiff was unjust or against public policy. 132 These four
exceptions reflect concern with two principles of public policy.' 33 The first and fourth exceptions, protection of plaintiffs
as class members or as a matter of justice or public policy,
rather clearly reflect a policy determination that the defense
will be disregarded when to do so is in the public interest. 134
Exceptions two and three, protection of plaintiffs acting under
fraud, duress, or ignorance of the wrong, simply appear to reflect the requirement of equal fault. Thus, the defendant will
not be allowed to claim protection under the in pani delicto
doctrine where the defendant's wrong is more reprehensible
than the plaintiff's in terms of either moral turpitude or the
13
amount of damage caused.
Defendants have made use of the in pari delicto defense in
lawsuits based on a variety of violations of the federal securities
laws, including Rule 10b-5.136 Typically, the Rule 10b-5 cases in
which the defense has been raised involve suits brought by tip132. Note, supra note 128, at 562. The author of the Note also grouped in
situation (3) instances of the plaintiff engaging in an independent wrong.
133. Comment, supra note 129, at 1164.
134. See, e.g., Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392
U.S. 134, 138-39 (1968) (in pari delicto not a defense to private antitrust action
where no congressional intent existed to allow the defense and where application would undermine private enforcement of antitrust laws) (holding on unrelated issue limited by Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467
U.S. 752, 777 (1984)); see also Comment, supra note 129, at 1164. Courts consider the public interest not only in deciding whether to disregard the doctrine
of in pa-i delicto, but also in applying the doctrine and assessing the parties'
relative culpabilities. See, e.g., Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive
Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 815-16 (1945) (doctrine of unclean hands
applied to bar suit for infringement of patents because public interest in having patent monopolies free from fraud or inequitable conduct is paramount);
Republic Molding Corp. v. B.W. Photo Utils., 319 F.2d 347, 350 (9th Cir. 1963)
(relative wrong of each party's injury to the public must be taken into account
in considering applicability of doctrine of unclean hands in action for patent
and copyright infringement and unfair competition).
135. See Comment, supra note 129, at 1164; 3 J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 942 (5th ed. 1941). For this purpose, the comparison of the parties'
culpabilities clearly is direct. This clarity is in contrast to the confusion generated by the justifiable reliance requirement, which leaves uncertain whether
culpabilities are to be compared directly or whether the respective culpabilities of the plaintiff and defendant are to be compared separately against the
same minimum standard. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
136. See Note, supra note 128, at 558.
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pees against tippers to recover for a decline in the value of setippers'
inside
to
the
pursuant
purchased
curities
information.1 3 7 In such cases, the tippee normally alleges that
the information was material, incorrect, and delivered fraudulently or recklessly. 138 The tippee further claims that she justifiably relied upon the inside information (or, if required by the
circuit in which suit is filed, that she exercised due diligence). 139 In response, the tipper usually claims that trading on
inside information is itself a violation of Rule 10b-5140 and that
the tippee should thus be barred from recovery on the basis of
equal fault.
Before the decision of the Supreme Court in Bateman
Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner,14 1 the success of the in
pari delicto defense in the context of insider trading was difficult to predict. The federal courts differed widely in their handling of the defense, both in determining whether a tippee's
137. See id. at 558-59; Note, The Availability of the In Pari Delicto Defense
in Tippee-Tipper Rule 10b-5 Actions After Dirks v. SEC, 62 WASH. U.L.Q 519,
523-24 (1984) [hereinafter Note, The Availability of the In Pari Delicto Defense]. Although the defense has been raised in other cases involving the defendant's violation of Rule 10b-5, the plaintiff's alleged wrongdoing in such
cases usually has violated some law other than Rule 10b-5. See, e.g., Mallis v.
Bankers Trust Co., 615 F.2d 68, 76 (2d Cir. 1980) (plaintiffs' alleged usurious
agreement to advance money for the purchase of unregistered securities insufficiently related to § 10(b) to support in pari delicto defense), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1123 (1981).
138. For discussion of the elements of a Rule 10b-5 cause of action, see
supra text accompanying notes 7-8 & 56.
139. See supra text accompanying note 81.
140. See Glickman, "Tippee" Liability Under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 20 U. KAN. L. REv. 47, 49 (1971). The
theory that insider trading by tippees violates Rule 10b-5 followed from the
broad interpretation of Rule 10b-5 in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d
833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert denied sub nom Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
There, the court held Rule 10b-5 applicable to anyone who possessed and
traded on material inside information. Id. at 848. Although the court was not
faced with the specific question whether a tippee's conduct was violative of
Rule 10b-5, it did note that a tippee's conduct "certainly could be equally reprehensible." I&L at 852-53. The issue became confused, however, after the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S.
222, 235 (1980), which held that an employee of a financial printer that had
been engaged by corporations to print corporate takeover bids did not violate
Rule 10b-5 by purchasing securities of target companies without disclosing to
sellers of securities that he knew of impending takeovers. The Court concluded that, because the employee had no fiduciary relationship with the sellers, and no other breach of fiduciary duty was properly raised, he had no duty
to disclose. Id. at 228. For a discussion of the fiduciary duty test for tippee
liability, see Note, The Availability of the In Pari Delicto Defense, supra note
137, at 538-39.
141. 105 S. Ct. 2622 (1985).
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culpability was equal to that of the tipper and in resolving the
question whether public policy was better served by allowing
the defense or by denyinlg it. Some courts dealt with the relative culpability question by treating tippers as the more culpable class.142 This reasoning usually was followed by a policy
determination that imposing liability on tippers would deter
dissemination of inside information and reduce the opportunity
for inside trading more effectively than requiring tippees to
bear their own losses. 143 Courts based this determination on a
belief that tippers are more sophisticated as a group, and thus
more likely to respond to deterrent measures than would tippees. In addition, courts observed that there would be no one
to complain of the tipper's violation if tippee suits were not
allowed. 4 4
Courts that allowed the in pani delicto defense in insider
trading cases usually dealt rather summarily with the requirement of equal or greater fault. 145 The plaintiff's policy argu142. See, e.g., Moholt v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 451, 453
(D.D.C. 1979) (tippers pose greater threat to regulatory framework prohibiting
insider trading than do tippees); Nathanson v. Weis, Voisin, Cannon, Inc., 325
F. Supp. 50, 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (tipper who is a broker-dealer "presents a
greater potential threat to undermining the statutory protection intended for
the public investor" than does tippee). The probable success of the approach of
treating tippers as more culpable than tippees was enhanced by the Court's
statement in Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 659 (1983) that "the tippee's duty to
disclose or abstain is derivative from that of the insider's duty."
143. See, e.g., Nathanson, 325 F. Supp. at 54-57; but see Kirkland v. E.F.
Hutton & Co., 564 F. Supp. 427, 434 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (analyzing policy determuination but concluding that in pani delicto defense does apply).
144. See Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700, 706 (5th Cir. 1969)
(Godbold, J., dissenting) (noting that a private action may be the most important weapon in enforcing laws prohibiting insider trading).
145. See, e.g., Tarasi v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 555 F.2d 1152, 1161-64 (3d
Cir.) (tippees' suit against tippers barred by in pari delicto defense because
tippees failed to disclose knowledge of possibility of merger before purchasing
securities), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 965 (1977); but see Kuehnert,412 F.2d at 70304 (concluding that the in pari delicto should be allowed in tipper-tippee suits
because disallowance would undermine the integrity of the courts and because
allowance would not diminish the deterrent effect of the threat of prosecution
by third parties and the enforcement agency). Occasionally, culpabilities were
balanced simply by noting that the participation of both parties was voluntary.
E.g., Kuehner 412 F.2d at 704 (noting that plaintiff's actions were entirely voluntary, constituting active participation in wrongdoing rather than mere
knowledge of another party's wrongdoing). Other courts required active participation by both parties. See, e.g., James v. DuBreuil, 500 F.2d 155, 159-60
(5th Cir. 1974) (seller's claim against buyer barred by doctrine of in pani
delicto because of seller's active participation in plan to violate securities laws);
Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 378 F. Supp. 112, 138
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) (counterclaim of underwriter who had actively participated in
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ments were rebutted by the argument that because Rule 10b-5

had been adopted to protect innocent investors, its goals would
not be hampered by requiring tippees to bear their own
losses.146 Moreover, acknowledgment of plaintiff fault was considered the only method of deterring tippee trading because
such trading is typically difficult for either the SEC or private
parties to detect. 147 Accordingly, such courts denied tippees an
action for breach of warranty against the tipper for losses incurred while trading on information known to be unavailable to
the public.148
2. Bateman Eichler,Hill Richards,Inc. v. Berner
The case of Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner 14 9 presented a factual situation quite typical of Rule 10b-5
cases in which the in pari delicto defense is raised. In Berner,
the plaintiff investors brought an action charging that they had
incurred substantial trading losses after a broker employed by
Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc., together with the president of a corporation, acted fraudulently to induce them to
purchase stock in the corporation. The claimed inducement
consisted of divulging false and materially incomplete information about the corporation on the pretext that it was accurate
inside information. The plaintiffs alleged violations of both
Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5.
The district court dismissed the complaint on the basis of
the in paridelicto defense, noting that, on the face of the complaint, the plaintiffs themselves had violated the very securities
laws under which the action was brought. On appeal to the
Ninth Circuit, the dismissal was reversed because the district
court failed to consider the relative fault of the parties and because of the appellate court's differing resolution of public policy considerations. 150 In light of the conflict among the lower
courts with respect to the application of the in pari delicto docissuing misleading securities financial report dismissed on ground of in parr
deZicto), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 540 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1976).
146. See Tarasi, 555 F.2d at 1162; Kuehnert, 412 F.2d at 704-05.
147. See Kuehnert, 412 F.2d at 705.
148. See id.; cf. Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136, 1148 (2d
Cir. 1970) (Friendly, J., dissenting) (arguing that the benefit of private enforcement might be offset by the inducement to violate securities laws provided by tippees' "enviable position" of either reaping the benefits of inside
information or suing when they do not), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971).
149. 105 S. Ct. 2622 (1985).
150. Berner v. Lazzaro, 730 F.2d 1319 (9th Cir. 1984).
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trine in Rule 10b-5 cases, 151 the United States Supreme Court
l 52
granted certiorari
In its opinion, the Court acknowledged the "dual premises"
of the in pari delicto defense. These premises were: "first, that
courts should not lend their good offices to mediating disputes
among wrongdoers; and second, that denying judicial relief to
an admitted wrongdoer is an effective means of deterring illegality."'1

53

The Court held, however, that there was no basis for

applying the in pari delicto defense at such a preliminary stage
of litigation-specifically on a motion to dismiss. 154 In so holding, the Court formally adopted a two-step approach for analyzing the in pari delicto defense employed by the lower courts,
stating that
a private action for damages in these circumstances may be barred on
the grounds of the plaintiff's own culpability only where (1) as a direct result of his own actions, the plaintiff bears at least substantially
equal responsibility for the violations he seeks to redress, and (2) preclusion of the suit would not significantly interfere with the effective
enforcement
of the securities laws and protection of the investing
55
public.1

Although the Court assumed for purposes of discussion
that the plaintiffs in Berner had violated Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 by reason of their actual or attempted tippee trading, the Court made it clear that additional evidence of culpability needed to be adduced before the plaintiffs' fault could be
regarded as equal to that of the defendants. Borrowing from
the reasoning of the lower courts that had found the in pari
delicto defense generally inapplicable in such situations, the
Court recognized "important distinctions" between the relative
151. See supra notes 141-148 and accompanying text.
152. 105 S. Ct. 776 (1985).
153. 105 S. Ct. at 2626-27 (footnotes omitted).
154. Id. at 2629 n.21.
155. Id. at 2629 (emphasis added). The Court discussed each prong of the
two-part test separately. For purposes of this Article, the first prong of the
test is referred to alternately as the "equal fault," "relative fault," or "relative
culpability" test and the second prong is referred to as the "policy" test. The
two-pronged test adopted by the Court in Berner was not novel. The same
considerations had been discussed by lower courts in many other areas, including that of tippee trading, see, e.g., Moholt v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 478
F. Supp. 451, 453 (D.D.C. 1979), and had been alluded to by the Court itself in
the antitrust context, see Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts
Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 138-39 (1968) (holding on unrelated issue limited by Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 777 (1984)). The Berner Court briefly discussed the effect of this precedent. 105 S. Ct. at 2628.
The superficial importance of Berner results only from the Court's application
of the two steps in a typical tippee trading case.
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156
culpabilities of tippers and tippees.
In distinguishing between tipper and tippee culpabilities,
the Court noted that, in the context of insider trading, a person
whose illegal act is solely derivative cannot be said to be as culpable as one whose breach of duty first gave rise to the deriva-

tive act.1 57

The Court went on to describe the potentially

broader range of violations committed by tippers, listing fraud
against individual shareholders (the only violation even arguably shared by tipper and tippee), breach of fiduciary duty to the
issuer, and fraud against the tippee.'-5 The last of these, according to the Court, was exacerbated in the case of securities
professionals who breach a duty of honesty and fair dealing toward clients.' 59 Further, the Court noted that tippers aroused
wrongful urges in tippees that might otherwise have remained
dormant and indicated that this factor by itself would suffice to
establish the tippers' "far greater" culpability.l 6 °
Turning to the second prong of its two-step analysis, the
Court recognized the primary objective of the federal securities
laws to be "protection of the investing public and the national
economy through the promotion of 'a high standard of business
ethics ..

. in every facet of the securities industry.' "161 The

best be
Court concluded that this legislative goal would
162
achieved by disallowing the in pari delicto defense.
In discussing the policy reason behind its decision, the
Court observed that tippees should be permitted to bring lawsuits both to expose false tippers and to supplement SEC enforcement efforts.' 63 The Court stated that deterrence of
insider trading would be maximized by pressuring the sources,
rather than the users, of inside information.- 64 The Court reasoned that this would be so both because the "first step in the
156.

105 S. Ct. at 2630.

157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id160. Id at 2631.
161. Id. (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180,
186-87 (1963).
162. Id. This conclusion was somewhat limited by the statement that "situations might well arise in which the relative culpabilities of the tippee and his
insider source merit a different mix of deterrent incentives." Id at 2632. This
statement suggests that the Court's policy findings were premised on an assessment of relative culpabilities. For an argument to the contrary, see infra
text accompanying notes 171-173.
163. 105 S.Ct. at 2631.
164. Id. at 2632.
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chain of dissemination" would be obliterated and because corporate insiders and broker-dealers would be more likely than
tippees to be advised by counsel and, thus, more likely to respond to deterrent pressures. 165 Finally, the Court rejected the
notion that it was granting to tippees an enforceable warranty
on the truth of secret information. It indicated that the "enforceable warranty" theory was overstated because recovery
could be had by tippees only against tippers who had acted with
scienter and because the threat of civil and criminal penalties
would deter tippees from attempting to enforce their claims. 166
3.

The Status of the In Par!Delicto Defense Since Berner

The Berner opinion makes it clear that, before the in pari
delicto defense will apply, a tippee must somehow engage in behavior that is more culpable than simply trading on inside information, presumably illicitly obtained. The tippee's activities
must be of such an extreme nature that it becomes appropriate
to upset the Court's determination that as a general policy matter it is more important to deter tippers than tippees. Because
the cases in which a tippee is found to be the more culpable
party will presumably be quite rare, however, it should be easy
for a court to conclude that failure to deter tippers in such infrequent circumstances would not be a "[significant interference] with the effective enforcement of the securities laws and
protection of the investing public.11 67
The Court in Berner engaged in relatively scanty analysis1 68 before adopting the classic formulation of the in pari

delicto defense requiring that the defendant attempting to invoke the defense show substantially equal or greater culpability
on the part of the plaintiff. The Court's primary justification
165.

Id.

166. Id. at 2632-33.
167. IMi at 2629.
168. The true significance of the Court's reasoning in Berner is concealed
by its more or less unquestioning adoption of the two-step approach and its apparent belief that both parts of the test would point to the same conclusion. If
the Court had instead determined that it is, in general, more important to deter tippees than tippers but also determined that tippees are typically less culpable than tippers, it might not have stated the two tests as cumulative. Of
course, such a situation might well be unlikely because the perceived cost of
nondeterrence is apt to color one's view of culpability. See supra note 142 and
accompanying text. See also infra text accompanying notes 171-172. Alternatively, the Court might have been more specific about some of the limitations
of its tests instead of merely implying that the limitations exist.
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69
for its decision was that it was supported by precedent1
Although earlier courts and commentators had attempted to
justify the requirement of equal or greater culpability on the
part of the plaintiff, the Court simply indicated that the fairness of the relative fault test is self-evident and irrefutable. At
first glance, the Court seemed to assume that if a plaintiff's
culpability did not exceed that of the defendant, the need to address the relevant policy considerations would be obviated.
In fact, the two-part Berner test cannot be taken at its face
value. This is evidenced by the Court's analysis of the relative
fault of the plaintiff and the defendant. The question of "fairness" as between the parties, without regard to the effects on
society, was not specifically addressed by the Court. Nonetheless, if it is assumed that the burden of the plaintiff's injury
must fall entirely on one or the other of the parties, allocation
of that burden to the more culpable of the two probably comports with common notions of fairness. 170 A concern with inter-party equity was thus reflected in the Court's culpability
comparison, although the importance of that equity vis-a-vis societal interests was left unclear. If the two-part test stated in
Berner were strictly applied, in those situations where the defendant is more culpable than the plaintiff, the defendant
would automatically be liable. The question of societal interest
is considered only where the plaintiff is found the more culpable of the two. The two steps of the test only make sense, however, if societal implications are taken into account and deemed
to be pro-plaintiff before a defendant's greater culpability is
made determinative.
A hard look at the wording of the Berner opinion further
reveals that the Court concealed its true line of reasoning. This
becomes apparent upon a consideration of two statements in
the Court's opinion. First, the Court made a qualifying statement that the equal fault and policy tests apply specifically to
"these circumstances."1'7 Second, the Court's used a quotation
from a Supreme Court case that limited the in pari delicto defense in federal antitrust cases to situations in which the plaintiff's fault is at least equal to that of the defendant: "[Bjecause

169. 105 S. Ct. at 2627-28.
170. This, of course, reckons without such externalities as the parties' relative needs (which may or may not be subsumed as extenuating factors in the
relative culpability determination), effects on the parties' families (which
probably would not be subsumed either in the relative culpability determination or the policy test), and the like.
171. 105 S. Ct. at 2629; see supra text accompanying note 155.
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of the strong public interest in eliminating restraints on competition, . . . many of the refinements of moral worth demanded
of plaintiffs by . . . many of the variations of in pari delicto
should not be applicable...."172 Both of these statements indicate that the Court's initial consideration was one of policy
rather than inter-party equity. Only after the policy determination had been resolved did the Court proceed to determine
the implications of the parties' relative fault.
If the foregoing analysis is correct,173 it suggests that the
two-step Berner test should be recharacterized as a list of at
least three questions. The initial question is whether, as a matter of social policy, it is more important to deter the typical
plaintiff or the typical defendant in the type of case addressed.
In Berner, the Court indicated that the answer to this question
is that it is more important to deter the typical tipper/defendant. The second question is which of the parties is
the more culpable. This question of fact, which involves a direct comparison of the relative faults of the plaintiff and the
defendant, was remanded to the lower court.
If the first two questions are answered in the plaintiff's
favor, the inquiry terminates. Thus, where it is more important
to deter typical defendants (as in the usual Rule 10b-5 in pari
delicto context) and the defendant is the more culpable of the
two, the plaintiff's suit can proceed. Only if the answer to the
second question goes against the plaintiff will the third, and final, question be reached. That question is whether, in the particular circumstances of the case, public interest considerations
outweigh considerations of inter-party equity. The Berner
Court left this question open, stating in a footnote:
Because there is no basis at this stage of the litigation for concluding
that the respondents bore substantially equal responsibility for the violations they seek to redress, we need not address the circumstances
in which preclusion of suit might otherwise significantly interfere
with the effective enforcement of the securities laws and protection of
174
the investing public.
172. 105 S. Ct. at 2628 (quoting Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International
Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 151 (1968) (Marshall, J., concurring in result)) (emphasis added).
173. This is, of course, in contrast to the Court's own suggestion. See
supra note 162.
174. 105 S. Ct. at 2632 n.30.
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THE ANALOGY BETWEEN THE IN PARI DELICTO
DEFENSE AND THE REQUIREMENT OF
JUSTIFIABLE RELIANCE
THE PRESENT RELATIONSHIP OF DOCTRINES EMPHASIZING
PLAINTIFF CONDUCT

In one sense, the justifiable reliance and the in pani delicto
doctrines may be viewed as related ways of dealing with a single basic question: In the context of the transaction at issue,
has the plaintiff acted as society would like? If the answer to
that question is "yes," neither doctrine will be called into play
and the plaintiff will not be barred from recovery for reasons
related to his own conduct. If the answer is "no," the analysis
associated with one or the other, or possibly both, of the doctrines may be invoked. Typically, if the plaintiff has been derelict in ascertaining the truth of a misrepresentation upon which
he based the decision to invest, the doctrine of justifiable reliance will be raised. If the plaintiff has been derelict with regard to a duty to make disclosure to others, as where a tippee
in pani delicto
trades without disclosing the tipped information,
175
analysis will presumably be called into play.
The relationship of these two doctrines, each of which focuses on the importance of plaintiff conduct, can be illustrated
by the following hypothetical. X, the chief financial officer of a
small but publicly traded corporation, separately informs indi175. Although the doctrine of justifiable reliance may seek to manipulate
the plaintiff's behavior for his own sake, societal interests, such as a desire to
discourage predatory behavior by depriving predators of ready targets, are also
at stake. Similar societal interests are considered in determining whether the
in pari delicto defense is to apply. Moreover, prevention of injury to the
plaintiff is sometimes a vital concern in the in pari delicto context. This is illustrated, for instance, in cases declining to apply the defense in situations involving federal antitrust laws. See, ag., Ring v. Spina, 148 F.2d 647, 652-53 (2d
Cir. 1945) (applying Sherman Act to excuse plaintiff's participation in the combination, even though there was no showing that he was forced to cooperate,
because the "Act seeks to protect [individuals] from combinations fashioned by
others and offered to such individual as the only feasible method by which he
may do business."); cf., e.g., Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal
Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 223 (1948) (applying Sherman Act to relieve plaintiff
grower-sellers of sugar beets even though they contracted with respondent refiner, because refiner's control of seed supply and market gave them virtually
no option). Refusal to apply the in par!delicto defense when the plaintiff is a
member of the class intended to be protected, see supra text accompanying
note 132, simply manifests judicial deference to a legislative determination of
the most efficient means of rendering that protection. It does not reflect any
necessary conclusion that injury to the plaintiff is somehow different in kind
from injury to another.
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vidual investors A and B that the company's net income in the
past quarter was three times that of any previous quarter. X
also tells A and B that when the company's financial results are
released the price of its stock will surely rise. A requests and
examines the relevant financial statements before purchasing
the company's securities. A could not have detected that these
statements were recklessly prepared. A generates sufficient
trading activity to result in an increase in the stock's price. A
makes additional purchases at the increased price. X sells her
own holdings of the company's stock to B in a private transaction at the market price. B has conducted no investigation of
the company's financial statements. When the company's correct financial results are eventually released, they show a moderate net loss. The price of the stock declines quickly. A and B
each sue X to recover their losses, making all necessary allegations. X defends against B on the grounds that X's statements
regarding the performance of the company were clearly suspect
and that B thus failed to meet the justifiable reliance standard.
X defends against A on the basis that, even if A's reliance were
justified by reason of his investigative diligence, trading on information believed to be secret is an attempt to defraud third
parties in violation of Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act of Rule 10b5 and renders A in pari delicto.
B. EXTENDING THE BERNER ANALYSIS
As discussed above, 176 the test established by the Supreme
Court in Berner severely limits the use of the in pa delicto
defense in Rule 10b-5 litigation.177 In light of this limitation,
the requirement of justifiable reliance arguably cannot be sustained. At its simplest and most persuasive, this argument reasons that if a plaintiff who is guilty of intentionally committing
a wrong against third parties will not be barred from recovery
by the in par delicto doctrine, recovery should also not be denied to a plaintiff who has probably been no more than reckless, and reckless only with respect to the possibility of injury
to himself. This argument is based on the notion that although
plaintiffs are of different types, they should be treated equally.
176. See supra text accompanying note 167.
177. It has not, however, eliminated it. See, e.g., Rothberg v. Rosenbloom,
628 F. Supp. 746, 755-58 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (distinguishing Berner by finding that
plaintiff tippee was the more culpable party and that barring plaintiffs suit on
the ground of in pa delicto would not significantly interfere with enforcement of securities laws because defendants, rather than plaintiff, brought the
fraudulent practices to light).
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The matter of inter-plaintiff equity may be illustrated by
reference to the hypothetical discussed above involving X, A,
and B. Given the post-Berner state of the law, A, the plaintiff
who investigated X's claims and then traded on the open market, probably will be able to recover from X despite having had
every reason to believe that he was working a fraud on the public at the time he made his investment. By contrast, B, who
made no investigation and traded only with X, runs somewhat
more of a risk of being precluded from recovery by virtue of his
failure to meet the justifiable reliance test. This result is, of
course, incongruous because B, unlike A, had no reason to believe that he was presenting any danger to anyone except
himself. 7 8
One way of resolving the paradox suggested by this illustration would be to modify the existing requirement of justifiable reliance to reflect the in pan delicto analysis of the Berner
opinion. Such a modification, which need not address the requirement of actual reliance,179 would involve the application of
the Supreme Court's relative fault test. That test requires that
"as a direct result of his own actions, the plaintiff [bear] at least
substantially equal responsibility for the violations he seeks to
redress .... " 180 As indicated above,' 8 ' a number of cases applying a justifiable reliance requirement already contain language
suggesting a comparison of the relative culpability of plaintiff
and defendant. Even where courts have not specifically acknowledged a consideration of relative culpability, concern with
inter-party equity has been evidenced by the consensus among
such courts that a plaintiff will be barred from recovery only if
he deviates from the standard of care to an extent that is more
82
culpable than negligence'
Unfortunately, even where courts have considered the relative culpability of the parties, they have failed to answer the
question whether the same minimum standard of conduct
should apply to both the plaintiff and the defendant or whether
178. The case presented by the X, A, B hypothetical is, of course, a very
sympathetic one. The incongruity of result might be less in a more complicated scenario.
179. To modify the justifiable reliance requirement without affecting the
actual reliance requirement, the two must be treated as separate elements.

See supra text accompanying note 81.
180. Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 105 S. Ct. 2622, 2629
(1985).
181. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
182. See id.
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the culpabilities of the parties must be directly compared. The
Court in Berner, however, gave no indication that the application of the same minimum standard to both parties would be
acceptable for in pari delicto purposes. Both the reliance of the
Court on lower court precedent, which contemplated a comparison of the parties' culpabilities, and the Court's requirement
that the plaintiff bear substantially equal responsibility indicate
that the Court adopted the direct comparison approach.
Applying the direct comparison approach to the relative
culpabilities of two parties in the context of a justifiable reliance analysis may have quite dramatic effects. Most obviously,
such an application would virtually eliminate any implication of
the plaintiff's conduct in cases where the defendant intended
injury to the plaintiff. 8 3 Even more sweeping consequences
might be achieved if the reasoning of the Berner court, that the
party initiating a chain of wrongful conduct generally is more
culpable than later participants in the chain, were adopted. Accordingly, application of the Berner relative fault test in cases
applying the justifiable reliance requirement would result in an
elimination of the traditional justifiable reliance issues in the
vast majority of cases.
The notion that all plaintiffs in Rule 10b-5 cases should be
subjected to the same test (of whether their individual responsibility exceeds that of the defendant) is appealing. Arguably,
however, cases giving rise to an assertion of the in pari delicto
defense typically involve the offense of fraudulent tipping and
thus are substantially different from other types of Rule 10b-5
cases. As such, they merit a greater concern for deterring such
defendant conduct. One notable distinction is that fraudulent
tipping, as opposed to certain other Rule 10b-5 violations, 8 4 has
183. Aspects of that conduct, however, still might present implications for
in pari delicto purposes. Thus, in the hypothetical involving X, A and B, intentional conduct on the part of X would virtually eliminate justifiable reliance considerations without necessarily eliminating those traditionally
relevant to the in par delicto defense.
184. For example, "garden variety" insider market trading allegedly leads
to gradual changes in the prices of securities, thus avoiding drastic price
swings at the time the insider's secret information becomes public. See, e.g.,
Lorie, Inside Trading: Rule 10b.5, Disclosureand CorporatePrivacy: A Comment 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 819, 819 (1980) (noting that trading, both inside and
outside, brings prices closer to equilibrium and thereby promotes efficiency in
the securities market); Wu, An Economist Looks at Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 260, 265-69 (1968) (discussing
classical economic theory under which speculation and, by extension, insider
trading theoretically benefit the free market by stabilizing prices); but see,
e.g., Mendelson, The Economics of Insider Trading Reconsidered (Book Re-
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no alleged social benefits. Accordingly, stamping out the activity of fraudulent tipping serves a stronger public interest.
In connection with the argument that fraudulent tipping is
"worse" than other Rule 10b-5 violations, it is typically argued
that, to stamp out fraudulent tipping, private actions are a "necessary supplement" to SEC enforcement action. L8 5 Unfortunately, the party injured by fraudulent tipping, and thus able to
sue, will often be the in pan delicto tippee.'8 6 In fact, despite
the possible breach of duty by the defendant and resulting injury to the larger group identified in Berner, 187 the tippee is
usually the only party who is injured by and aware of the defendant's wrongdoing. In other Rule 10b-5 contexts, the likelihood is greater that both deserving and undeserving parties will
be injured and aware of the possibility of recovery. L8 8 Thus,
the need in such contexts to permit undeserving plaintiffs to recover is less pressing.
Even assuming that there is a special need to encourage
plaintiffs to bring actions in the insider trading context, it does
not necessarily follow that the supply of plaintiffs in other Rule
10b-5 cases must be restricted. 8 9 Accordingly, the argument
that the requirement of justifiable reliance must be preserved
because there is a greater concern with deterrence of defendants in the typical in pari delicto context is illogical. This proposition is illustrated by the hypothetical fraudulent tipping case
in which the plaintiff's conduct runs afoul of both the traditional justifiable reliance doctrine and the traditional in pani
delicto defense. If there really is a need for private plaintiffs in
view), 117 U. PA. L. REV. 470, 472-76 (1969) (arguing that insider trading does
not operate to correct "wispricings" of stock in the market, but rather contributes to a persistent misallocation of resources).
185. See, e.g., Berner, 105 S. Ct. at 2628.
186. In fact, unless the tip results in trading sufficient to affect market
price, the tippee may be the only party injured.
187. See supra text accompanying note 158. Although the Supreme Court
pointed out that a breach by the defendant of a duty to the issuer and its
shareholders is possible, in many cases this breach will not result in an injury.
This generally would be the case when a false tip is passed on only for the purpose of generating commissions. If, however, the tip results in an effect on the
market price of the issuer's securities, those trading in the security might have
a claim against the defendant based on manipulation, fraud on the market, or

otherwise.
188. Justifiable reliance issues most often arise, however, in the context of
face-to-face transactions and in any given case there probably will not be a
choice of plaintiffs.
189. Such reasoning would be akin to arguing that, although vitamins are
good for everyone and are in plentiful supply, only the sick should take them
because they need them more than the healthy.
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fraudulent tipping contexts, neither kind of plaintiff conduct
should constitute a bar to recovery. In other words, if fraudulent tipping is involved, it seems that both the in pari delicto
defense and justifiable reliance requirement should be eliminated (or limited to the same extent) to encourage a steady
supply of plaintiffs as private enforcement officers.
Moreover, and more importantly, it is evident that the argument based on the special need for plaintiffs in the insider
trading context is unrelated to a concern with either interparty or inter-plaintiff equity. The Berner Court considered
such an argument, not in connection with its relative fault text,
but rather in connection with its conclusion that barring plaintiff recovery in such cases does not undermine enforcement of
the federal securities laws or protection of the investing public.
According to the Court's two-step approach, consideration of
the effect of barring plaintiff recovery on the securities laws or
on the investing public is not necessary unless there is also a
finding that the plaintiff is at least as culpable as the defendant.
Thus, even if there is no special need to encourage plaintiffs to
bring suit in cases outside the in pari delicto context, the
Court's own articulated analysis suggests that the concept of
relative fault is basic to any analysis of the issue.
As noted above,1 90 the two-step approach outlined by the
Supreme Court in Berner was actually a three-step analysis.
The Court posed the questions of (1) whether, in a particular
type of case, it is more important to deter the defendant's or
plaintiff's conduct, (2) which of the two actual parties is the
more culpable, and (3) where the answers to the first two questions are not the same, whether public interest outweighs considerations of inter-party equity. Because the nature and
quantum of the parties' conduct in the typical in pa delicto
case was determinable, the Court had little difficulty comparing
the impact of the plaintiff's conduct with the impact of the defendant's conduct. To make the comparison, and thus to answer its own first question, the Court assumed ideal behaviors
for both the plaintiff and the defendant. These were, respectively, refraining from trading on tips and refraining from
fraudulent tipping. The Court then considered the costs associated with deviations from the two ideals-that is, in each case,
failure to refrain-and the value of the benefits to be obtained
from deterrence.
Standards for measuring deviations from ideal conduct,
190. See supra text accompanying notes 173-74.
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however, are not as well-developed in the justifiable reliance
context. 191 This is most likely the result of both judicial confusion and the variety of factual contexts in which the issue of
justifiable reliance has arisen. Reasons for the condition
notwithstanding, the lack of standards in the justifiable reliance context appears to preclude easy application of the type of
analysis employed by the Court in Berner. If this is true, the
question of which party generally is favored by the public inter92
est in the justifiable reliance context remains unanswered.
Elimination of the Berner general policy analysis in the
justifiable reliance context is not as facile as it may initially
seem. Part HA of this Article was itself a policy analysis concluding that the only real significance of the justifiable reliance
requirement lay in its implications for inter-party equity. That
conclusion suggests, as a general matter, that public policy favors the least culpable of the parties and that the relative-culpability step of the three-part Berner analysis may, and should,
be reached directly.
If the answer to the first question of the three-part Berner
analysis cannot be determined, that answer of course cannot
conflict with the answer to the second question of the analysis.
This does not mean, however, that courts should never address
the third of Berner's questions. There obviously should be
some reservation about a test that consists of only an interparty culpability comparison. 193 It would be ridiculous to conclude that, just because the public interest cannot be identified
as a general matter, public policy will never be implicated in a
justifiable reliance case. The public interest will undoubtedly
arise in any number of factual circumstances. Accordingly, in
any particular case where a public interest may be identified
and runs counter to the result of the inter-party culpability
comparison, the policy determination should be weighed against
191. See supra text accompanying note 69.
192. Some commentators have attempted to demonstrate that the requirement of justifiable reliance (often described as the duty of care) should be limited as a matter of legislative intent or the like. See, e.g., Sachs, supra note 39
(arguing that Rule 10b-5 duty of care is inconsistent with common law and
with statutory structure and policy and should be abandoned). These commentators presumably would conclude that the public interest generally favors

the plaintiff.
193. This is particularly true insofar as the methodology of this comparison
is, as yet, somewhat imprecise. See infra note 195 and accompanying text.

The outcome of the comparison, however, probably is more predictable in the
justifiable reliance context than in the context of in pari delicto. See supra
text accompanying note 183.
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the interest of inter-party equity. This, of course, is the final
step of the restated three-part Berner analysis. It should also
be the final step in a modified justifiable reliance analysis.
CONCLUSION
Section IIA of this Article rejected a number of the rationales allegedly underlying the justifiable reliance requirement
and concluded that the only legitimate rationale for the requirement is the balancing of inter-party equities. Thus, the
consideration of the plaintiff's conduct in this context can be
characterized as largely a desire to achieve equity between the
parties to the action. This indicates that, in actions brought
under Rule 10b-5 for misrepresentation, the requirement that a
plaintiff prove justifiable reliance in addition to actual reliance
can, and should, be eliminated. 194 In its place, an analysis based
on the second and third steps of the Court's restated approach
in Berner should be substituted.
This proposal is easily justified. An extension of the Berner approach would result in an equitable treatment of plaintiff
classes, given that courts would apply the same test to all plaintiffs. In addition, because the first applicable step of the Berner
analysis requires a plaintiff to be "at least" as culpable as the
defendant before the final, policy-weighing step of the analysis
is reached, inter-party equity also would be consistently
achieved.
To fully understand the impact that the Berner approach
would have in the justifiable reliance context, the two steps of
the approach need to be considered separately. Of the two, the
step involving comparison of inter-party culpability will have
the greater impact because it may dispose of the issue of a
plaintiff's conduct in most of the cases in which it is applied. In
addition, application of this step will moot the issue of whether
justifiable reliance can exist if due diligence is not exercised.
Comparison of the parties' culpabilities would also tend to obviate the need to articulate the plaintiff's duty in subjective or
objective terms.195 Moreover, since the inter-party culpability
comparison would be considered separately from the test for
actual reliance, yet another source of the existing confusion
194. To the extent that actual reliance is not a separate element in all jurisdictions, see supra text accompanying notes 96-98, it is suggested that it be
made so.
195. Some such articulation, however, might be both possible and helpful.
See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
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would be eliminated. The result of all of this would be a simplification of Rule 10b-5 litigation.
The impact of the application of the final Berner test, the
policy test, is more difficult to predict. This Article has not directly addressed the rare situation in which a plaintiff's culpability equals or outweighs that of the defendant. As noted
above, 196 however, the Berner Court itself declined to resolve
the question whether the unusually culpable plaintiff should
bear her own loss. In contrast, the Court was quite willing to
consider other matters, such as the likelihood that a plaintiff's
culpability would exceed that of a defendant, from a more general standpoint. This omission in the Court's analysis suggests
recognition of the rarity with which courts will have to deal
with the relatively more culpable plaintiff. This rarity justifies
the assumption that such an occurrence will be too fact-specific
to deal with in advance and suggests that the problem, when it
arises, be dealt with on a case-by-case basis.
In conclusion, it should be acknowledged that several of
the arguments advanced in this Article are based on the present inadequacies found to exist in justifiable reliance doctrine.
This Article argues, for instance, that because potential defendants do not know what standard of care plaintiff's conduct will
be measured against, abandonment of the justifiable reliance
requirement would have no practical consequence on a potential defendant's ability to determine disclosure requirements. If
the requirement of justifiable reliance were better defined,
however, this argument might not be made. Similarly, it could
be argued that in a more perfect world a different and preferable system for dealing with the relative culpability of parties
could be devised. A comparative fault approach dividing losses
197
between the parties might be an example of such a system.
Any such system, however, represents a drastic change from
existing law and is by no means imminent or likely. Accordingly, the proposals described in this section are advanced in
the belief that, if adopted, they would improve the present system with a minimum amount of disruption.

196. See supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text.
197. See generally Note, A Comparative Fault Approach to the Due Diligence Requirement of Rule 10b-5, 49 FoRDHAM L. REV. 561 (1981) (suggesting
that the due diligence requirement that bars recovery to culpable plaintiffs in
Rule 10b-5 cases be reformulated as a comparative fault rule which would
serve to reduce but not deny recovery).

